STATUTORY RULEMAKING
CONSIDERATIONS
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF REGULATORY
IMPACT ANALYSIS

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A fundamental question any regulator must ask when deciding whether to issue a new rule is whether the proposed intervention does more good than harm.\textsuperscript{1} As economists have long recognized, regulation can enhance overall welfare when markets or public institutions fail to produce efficient results. Governments also use regulation to advance distributional or other social goals unrelated to welfare maximization. But regulatory reallocation of resources means that we sacrifice some good things in order to obtain the benefits the regulation provides. To identify whether a prospective regulation does more good than harm and produces desired outcomes in the most

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cost-effective manner, the regulatory agency should understand the significance and cause of the problem it wishes to solve, examine a range of potential solutions, and understand the likely effects of each of those alternatives. 2

Though these basic principles are fairly unobjectionable in theory and have obtained nearly universal acceptance among regulators, politicians, and those who study the administrative state, the actual process of integrating them into regulatory decisionmaking has involved a drawn-out history featuring all three branches of government and a number of controversial decisions. Congress often directs specific agencies to consider the economic effects of their regulations (or prohibits the agency from considering the same) or even to select a specific regulatory alternative identified by the economic analysis. More recently, Congress has considered several proposals that would require all agencies to conduct an economic analysis of significant rules including an explicit definition of the underlying problem and an assessment of the benefits and costs of the proposed solution as well as those of the key alternatives. 4 These proposals also explicitly authorize


the federal courts to review the underlying economic analysis when assessing whether the agency has offered sufficient justification for a rule.\(^5\)

A great deal has been written, both positive and negative, about the potential effects of such cross-cutting regulatory reforms.\(^6\) Largely missing from the debate, however, is an evidence-based assessment of whether statutory economic analysis requirements would in fact produce the results their proponents seek. To be effective, such requirements must be enforced by the courts and implemented by agencies. This Article examines statutory economic analysis requirements already on the books, assessing how the courts interpret and enforce them and how well the regulatory agencies carry them out.

To determine how statutory language affects the review conducted by courts when agencies’ rules are challenged, we examine thirty-three opinions from the federal courts of appeals assessing agencies’ economic analyses in rulemakings that have emerged in the past thirty years.\(^7\) In their seminal study of judicial review of benefit–cost analysis, Caroline Cecot and Kip Viscusi conclude that when examining agency economic analysis,
courts often take their cues from statutory language and behave inconsistently in the absence of statutory guidance.\(^8\) We identify how the courts’ treatment of agency analysis varies systematically with the specificity of statutory language. Our analysis, which appears in Section II, suggests that courts scrutinize agencies’ economic analyses much more closely when the relevant statute either provides a specific list of economic costs and benefits that the issuing agency must consider or calls for the selection of a particular regulatory alternative that meets criteria articulated in the statute (such as the least restrictive option). Conversely, when the statute simply directs the agency to “consider” economic benefits or costs, requires the agency to adopt an economically “feasible” regulation, or uses some other vague formulation, the rigor of review applied by courts varies greatly. Some courts apply a level of analysis tantamount to that seen in cases involving a more specific statutory standard, whereas others defer almost completely to the agency’s judgment.

To identify how regulatory agencies respond to analytical requirements in statutes, we examine data evaluating the quality and claimed use of regulatory impact analysis for the 130 economically significant, prescriptive regulations proposed by Executive Branch agencies between 2008 and 2013.\(^9\) This dataset was produced as part of the Regulatory Report Card project at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University.\(^10\) Our econometric analysis in Section III reveals that when statutes require or prohibit agencies from considering specific factors—such as benefits or costs—agencies tend to conduct more thorough analysis of the factors they are required to consider and less thorough analysis of the factors they are not required to consider or are prohibited from considering. When agencies are required to consider economic factors, they also tend to offer more thorough explanations of how they used the regulatory impact analysis in their decisions. Agencies tend to do this to a greater degree when the statute offers more specific guidance about the benefit or cost factors they must consider.

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8. Id. at 598–600.


The correlation between statutory directives and scores for the quality and claimed use of regulatory impact analysis persists even when we include a control variable indicating whether a federal appeals court previously evaluated the agency’s economic analysis for a similar regulation issued under a similar or predecessor statute. Moreover, an agency’s analysis of the benefits and costs of regulation is more thorough when the agency was previously involved in this kind of litigation.

Taken together, these findings suggest that the threat of judicial review is a key element that induces agencies to respond to analytical requirements written into statutes. Prior research has found that agencies tend to evade mandated rulemaking procedures that are less frequently enforced by judicial review.11 We are aware of no study, however, that examines the level of scrutiny applied by courts depending on the type of statutory economic analysis requirement imposed. We also are aware of no study examining whether more specific statutory analytical requirements are systematically associated with higher-quality economic analysis for a relatively large sample of regulations. This Article provides those answers.

We conclude the Article by exploring the implications of our findings for statutory reform efforts. As we have argued elsewhere, Congress’s revived interest in providing more explicit direction to agencies on how to conduct and use economic analysis is a welcome development, as the ad hoc process currently playing out in the agencies and courts leaves many unanswered questions that create significant uncertainties for regulators and regulated parties alike.12 Nevertheless, how Congress goes about enacting such reform is critical, as merely layering on additional vague analytical requirements may do more harm than good. Though we take no position in this Article on whether Congress should impose more stringent economic analysis requirements on agencies or on what form those requirements should take, we examine the downstream effects of the various standards and urge Congress to consider these effects when contemplating statutory changes. Moreover, we presume that Congress intends that the courts apply a consistent standard of review when interpreting identical or similar statutory language, and we encourage Congress to avoid recycling statutory language that has led to highly inconsistent interpretations by the courts in the past.

I. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND THE MODERN REGULATORY STATE

This Section provides an overview of the economic analysis require-

ments under which agencies currently operate, including those imposed both by statute and by executive order. It also charts the extent to which agencies’ economic analyses are subject to judicial review and highlights the federal courts’ increasingly expansive view of their role in this arena. Finally, it sets forth the methodology by which the Article will study the effects of different statutory economic analysis requirements.

A. Existing Economic Analysis Requirements

As the modern administrative state emerged over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, proponents of regulation exhibited at least an inchoate understanding of the economic tradeoffs underlying regulatory decisionmaking: regulatory interventions can combat social ills and even enhance market efficiency by remedying market failures, yet these interventions impose costs on regulated entities as well as the rest of society.\(^\text{13}\) Over this period, which included the explosion of federal regulation in the New Deal and post-World War II eras, Congress exhibited a high degree of faith in the experts staffing federal agencies, issuing broad mandates directing regulators to act in the “public interest.”\(^\text{14}\)

The 1960s and 1970s saw a dramatic expansion in social regulation intended to reduce risks.\(^\text{15}\) But also beginning in the 1960s, numerous high-ranking officials in the Executive Branch began to doubt that the various federal agencies were capable of independently assessing the effects of their regulations on the national economy.\(^\text{16}\) Early in Richard Nixon’s admin-


14. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012) (“The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent [persons and entities subject to statute] from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”); National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2012) (“The Board shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter.”); Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 303(f) (2012) (directing the agency to “[m]ake such regulations not inconsistent with law as it may deem necessary to prevent interference between stations and to carry out the provisions of this chapter”).

15. MARC ALLEN EISNER, REGULATORY POLITICS IN TRANSITION 118–25 (2d ed. 2000).

16. The rapid proliferation of regulatory agencies further accentuated the need for some form of centralized review to ensure that agencies did not run amok in imposing excessive burdens on the economy. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., REGULATORY
administration, the President rolled out an initiative known as the Quality of Life Review, which tasked the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) with performing a centralized review of regulations emerging from the various agencies and ensuring that the cumulative regulatory burden did not grow too ponderous for businesses to bear.\(^\text{17}\) Though President Jimmy Carter elected not to continue this initiative, he embraced the overall concept of economic analysis of federal regulations and lent it enhanced institutional legitimacy, issuing an executive order on “Improving Government Regulations.”\(^\text{18}\) Among other things, Carter’s executive order directed individual agencies to identify the underlying problem they intend to solve, assess key alternatives, consider the economic effects of the preferred course of action and the alternatives, and offer a reasoned explanation for the option selected.\(^\text{19}\)

Since the initial Carter executive order, every subsequent administration has issued a similar order that has reaffirmed and supplemented the overall framework. President Ronald Reagan built on the basic structure by offering more specific requirements for what a regulatory impact analysis must contain and reintroducing centralized review, requiring that agencies submit rules to the director of the OMB for assessment, a task ultimately placed in the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).\(^\text{20}\) President Bill Clinton softened the Reagan approach in certain respects, specifying that OIRA would review only “significant” regulations and requiring a full regulatory impact analysis only for “economically significant” regulations, but he left the overall system fundamentally intact.\(^\text{21}\) Every subsequent administration has explicitly endorsed the Clinton executive order, though each has elaborated on it in certain important respects.\(^\text{22}\) Throughout this entire period, the regulatory review regime has not been applied to so-called independent regulatory agencies (e.g., the Securities and Ex-


\(^{17}\) Jim Tozzi, OIRA’s Formative Years: The Historical Record of Centralized Regulatory Review Preceding OIRA’s Founding, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 37, 44–47 (2011).


\(^{19}\) Exec. Order No. 12,044, § 3(b)(1), 43 Fed. Reg. at 12,663.


change Commission (SEC), Federal Trade Commission, Federal Communications Commission (FCC)), though presidents have asserted their authority to do so if they choose.23

During the past forty years, Congress has been comparatively less active in promoting regulatory economic analysis, tacitly blessing the regime created by the Executive Branch but enacting relatively few statutory reforms. In a number of instances, Congress has updated statutory language to require specific agencies to perform economic analysis when preparing certain rules. For instance, Congress amended various statutory provisions governing the SEC to require the agency to consider “efficiency, competition, and capital formation” when determining whether rules are in the public interest.24

Congress has also extensively debated the merits of imposing a cross-cutting economic analysis requirement and empowering the courts to review agencies’ compliance therewith. In 1981, a bipartisan group of senators introduced the Regulatory Reform Act.25 Among other things, the bill would have required all major rules to undergo a regulatory impact analysis (i.e., an analysis that defines the underlying problem, identifies alternative approaches, and assesses the benefits and costs of the alternatives) and would have authorized courts to review agency rules in light of the findings of that analysis.26 In subsequent sessions of Congress over the following


26. Id. § 3; Bull & Ellig, supra note 2, at 806–08.
decades, some variation of the Regulatory Reform Act of 1981 was repeatedly reintroduced. Though these bills typically drew bipartisan support, the legislation never passed.

Most recently, the last several sessions of Congress have considered a bill known as the Regulatory Accountability Act. The bill includes numerous changes to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). With respect to economic analysis, it would require agencies to define the problem they intend to solve and to consider “a reasonable number of alternatives” for all proposed rules. For major rules, agencies would also be required to consider the benefits and costs of the potential alternatives. In addition, the Regulatory Accountability Act directs the agency to rely on “the best reasonably available scientific, technical, or economic information.” As to judicial review, much like the Regulatory Reform Act of 1981, the economic analysis is considered as part of the entire record, along with any other information undergirding a rule.

In addition to its procedural requirements, the Regulatory Accountability Act also includes a substantive decisionmaking standard for all major rules. The agency must make a determination that the benefits of the rule “justify the costs” and that “no alternative considered would achieve the relevant statutory objectives in a more cost-effective manner than the rule.” The bill does not define the terms “justify” or “cost-effective,” so it is unclear whether it would require net-benefit maximization or selection of the least costly alternative, or whether the agency simply must provide a rational explanation for why it selected the option it did, regardless as to


30. Id.
31. Id. § 3(f)(3).
32. Id. § 4.
33. See id. § 3(f)(2)(D). The Senate version of the bill limits the applicability of the cost-justification requirement to instances in which another statute does not impose a different standard, S. 951, 115th Cong. § 3 (2017), whereas the House version contains no such limitation, H.R. 5, 115th Cong. § 103 (2017).
Congressional debate occurs against a backdrop of evolving judicial doctrines that have increasingly encouraged regulatory agencies to conduct economic analysis of regulations when not prohibited by statute. Courts have directly reviewed agencies’ statutorily-required economic analyses and, in a handful of cases, have even reviewed analyses not required by statute. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently suggested that an agency cannot ignore the economic effects of a rule, even in cases where the statute is silent on regulatory benefits and costs. Some scholars predict that courts are evolving toward a doctrine holding that an agency acts arbitrarily and capriciously if it fails to consider benefits and costs when the legislation authorizing the regulation gives the agency discretion to do so.

In short, the existing framework is a patchwork in which many agency rules must undergo some form of economic analysis but significant interstices exist. For instance, independent regulatory agencies are currently exempt from the presidential regulatory review process, though various statutory provisions direct many of those agencies to perform some form of economic analysis for certain rules. For agencies subject to the presidential review regime, only “economically significant” rules must be accompanied by a full regulatory impact analysis that quantifies benefits and costs of the rule and alternatives. For “significant” rules, an explanation of the need for, and benefits and costs of, the rule is sufficient. Reform bills such as the Regulatory Accountability Act would greatly expand and clarify the scope of economic analytical requirements, but the decisionmaking standard would still leave a number of unanswered questions.

B. The Scope of Judicial Review

Judicial review of agency economic analysis can take two different forms. One form of judicial review involves examining the rulemaking record to

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34. See generally Bull & Ellig, supra note 2.

35. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (interpreting the exceedingly “capacious[]” statutory mandate to adopt “appropriate and necessary” regulation to require the agency to pay “at least some attention to cost”); id. at 2716–17 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that it is per se arbitrary and capricious to ignore regulatory costs when a statute does not explicitly direct an agency to do so).


ensure that the agency fully developed the evidence on which it relied and reached a rational conclusion in light of the available evidence. Though this type of review is often referred to as “procedural,” it involves more than simply ensuring that the agency checked all the relevant boxes. The court also assesses the quality of the agency’s evidence and ensures that the conclusions reached flow logically from the information on which the agency relied. Nevertheless, the court must not substitute its judgment for that of the agency and must defer to any rational conclusion. By contrast, when applying what has traditionally been referred to as “substantive” review, the court seeks to determine whether the agency followed the decisionmaking rule specified in the statute. For instance, if a statute requires selection of the least restrictive alternative, the court will actually parse the evidence to ensure that the agency selected the option with the smallest compliance costs.

Courts have been conducting the former type of review with respect to agencies’ economic analyses for quite some time. In statutory regimes in which Congress has explicitly directed agencies to conduct some form of economic analysis, courts have assessed agencies’ evidence to ensure that they performed each of the required steps of a regulatory impact analysis (definition of problem, identification of alternatives, assessment of benefits and costs of key alternatives) and reached a rational conclusion on the basis of the evidence available. Interestingly, though it is far less common, courts have also occasionally conducted this sort of review even in the absence of a statutory requirement to assess a rule’s economic effects. For instance, in Charter Communications, Inc. v. FCC, the court examined the agency’s evidence concerning the costs of a ban on certain types of set-top converter boxes, notwithstanding the fact that the relevant statute contained no requirement to consider those costs. Courts have been more equivocal on whether the findings of a regulatory impact analysis prepared pursuant to an executive order requirement are reviewable, though this evidence likely can be con-

38. Bull & Ellig, supra note 2, at 808–09.
39. Id.
41. Bull & Ellig, supra note 2, at 808–09.
42. See generally id.
43. See generally id.
44. 460 F.3d 31 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
45. Id. at 41–42.
sidered to the extent the agency relies on it in justifying a rule.\textsuperscript{47}

Courts have also conducted the latter type of review in cases in which there is a statutory standard for them to apply. For instance, in \textit{Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA},\textsuperscript{48} the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed an agency’s decision to ban the production and use of asbestos.\textsuperscript{49} At the time, the relevant statute, the Toxic Substances Control Act, contained language directing the agency to adopt the “least burdensome requirement.”\textsuperscript{50} The court concluded that the agency had completely failed to justify its decision under this strict standard, as it adopted the most burdensome possible approach (an outright ban) and failed to explain why potentially less restrictive alternatives were infeasible.\textsuperscript{51}

Interestingly, in recent years, the courts have also shown a willingness to examine the substantive aspects of an agency’s economic analysis even in the absence of a statutory requirement to adopt a specific regulatory alternative. The most prominent example of this line of reasoning appears in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in \textit{Michigan v. EPA}.\textsuperscript{52} The majority opinion engages in a fairly straightforward exercise of statutory interpretation, concluding that statutory language directing the agency to adopt a rule that is “appropriate and necessary” requires some attention to regulatory costs.\textsuperscript{53} Justice Elena Kagan’s dissent, though more generous to the agency with respect to its interpretation of the statute at hand, actually goes quite a bit further in suggesting that an agency that fails to consider regulatory costs when not statutorily proscribed from doing so necessarily behaves arbitrarily and capriciously.\textsuperscript{54} Kagan further suggests that a rule imposing significant costs while creating few benefits will not survive judicial review.\textsuperscript{55}

It is an open question whether this line of reasoning has placed a gloss on the APA’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard that requires agencies both

\textsuperscript{47} See, e.g., Examining the Proper Role of Judicial Review in the Federal Regulatory Process, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs & Fed. Mgmt., S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. 4 (2015) (testimony of Ronald M. Levin, William R. Orthwein Distinguished Prof. of Law, Washington Univ. in St. Louis); Bull & Ellig, supra note 2, at 761–63; Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 7, at 603–05.

\textsuperscript{48} 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).

\textsuperscript{49} See generally id.

\textsuperscript{50} Id. at 1214–15.

\textsuperscript{51} Id. at 1215–16.

\textsuperscript{52} 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).

\textsuperscript{53} Id. at 2707.

\textsuperscript{54} Id. at 2716–17 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

\textsuperscript{55} Id. at 2717.
to conduct some species of economic analysis and to provide at least some justification for the economic effects of proposed rules. Nevertheless, given this trend in the federal courts, agencies will likely feel compelled to give at least passing consideration to a proposed rule’s economic effects and to offer some justification couched in economic terms for the rule they ultimately adopt, except in those rare instances in which an agency is statutorily foreclosed from doing so.

C. Structure of Study

As the foregoing subsections make clear, under existing law, agencies confront a number of uncertainties in deciding how to apply economic analysis in developing their rules. An agency may face some or all of the following questions when conducting a rulemaking:

- In the absence of a statutory economic analysis requirement, will any such analysis conducted pursuant to executive order or prepared voluntarily be subject to judicial review?
- How stringently will a court review an agency’s economic analysis?
- Does the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of the APA implicitly impose an economic analysis requirement?
- Do different statutory standards require different levels of analysis? For instance, does a statute requiring an agency to “consider benefits and costs” mandate a more rigorous analysis than a statute merely directing the agency to adopt a regulatory intervention that is “feasible”?
- Short of a directive to select a particular regulatory alternative (e.g., that which maximizes net benefits or minimizes economic costs), does vague statutory language requiring the agency to “justify” the regulatory benefits and costs or to adopt a “cost effective” alternative meaningfully limit the range of options an agency can consider?

As noted above, Congress has recently exhibited great interest in implementing statutory reforms that would address some or all of these questions. Though statutory reform could bring much needed clarity to a rapidly evolving area of law, it could also introduce even greater uncertainty if not done carefully.

56. See Sunstein, supra note 36.
In an earlier paper, we addressed the first two questions posed above. We recommended that Congress amend the APA to define the elements of a regulatory impact analysis and to clarify that courts are to review rules in light of this analysis to ensure that the agency relied on the best available evidence in reaching its ultimate conclusion. We also recommended that Congress clarify that the stringency of review should resemble that deployed by courts applying what has come to be known as the “hard look” standard of “arbitrary and capricious review.”

In that paper, we intentionally set aside the question of whether Congress should impose a statutory economic analysis requirement, instead focusing exclusively on how to design an effective judicial review regime. Here, we directly examine statutory economic analysis requirements, though we do not argue in favor of any specific type of standard or even take a position on whether the existence of such a standard is preferable to its absence. Rather, we examine the range of preexisting options and explore their downstream effects both with respect to the rigor of judicial review and the type of analysis conducted by agencies. Our conclusions should be highly relevant to Congress as it grapples with the final three questions posed above.

Additionally, though we do not advocate any specific standard in this paper, we do assume that Congress would prefer that whatever standard it adopts be applied consistently by the courts. That is, if courts applying identical or very similar standards review rules very rigorously at times, but exhibit a high level of deference to agencies at other times, this is undesirable insofar as it creates uncertainty for agencies and undermines Congress’s probable intent.

To assess the effects of the various statutory standards, we begin by assembling a set of cases that includes nearly all federal court of appeals decisions assessing a rule’s economic analysis under the standard announced in the Supreme Court’s *State Farm* decision. We classify the various statutory standards into five major categories and then explore how rigorously the reviewing courts have examined agencies’ factfinding when applying each standard. Section II presents our findings.

Separately, we have accessed evaluations of the analysis accompanying the 130 prescriptive, economically-significant regulations proposed between

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58. *Id.*
2008 and 2013. For this dataset, we again identify the various statutory economic analysis standards, which line up very closely with the categories identified in Section II. We then perform an econometric analysis to determine whether the statutory standards are correlated with the quality and claimed use of analysis performed under each of the standards. Section III sets forth this analysis.

We conclude by comparing the results of the case law and econometric analyses, exploring the extent to which certain standards trigger higher-quality analysis in agencies, the courts, or both. We provide a set of observations that should prove useful to Congress as it considers how best to ensure consistency in the analysis conducted by courts and agencies when applying statutory economic analysis standards.

II. EFFECTS OF STATUTORY STANDARDS ON JUDICIAL REVIEW

This Section seeks to determine whether the courts engage in a more searching review of the agency’s economic reasoning when the underlying statutory standard is either more prescriptive or more detailed. To do so, we review a reasonably complete sample of federal court of appeals decisions assessing regulatory agencies’ economic analyses under Section 706 of the APA since the State Farm decision articulated the contemporary “hard look” standard in 1983.60 Most of the cases apply the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review; a few apply the “substantial evidence” standard.61 We have chosen to use that sample of cases because it represents a

60. This is the same sample of cases used by the authors in a previous paper that evaluated statutory reforms designed to enhance the courts’ judicial review of agencies’ regulatory impact analyses. See Bull & Ellig, supra note 2. Caroline Cecot and Kip Viscusi originally developed a broadly representative sample of thirty-eight cases in which federal appeals courts evaluated the quality of regulatory agencies’ benefit–cost analyses. Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 7. We identified a few additional cases in a previous study. Bull & Ellig, supra note 2. The thirty-three cases discussed in this paper are those that involved challenges under Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). These previous papers addressed the extent to which courts have reviewed agencies’ regulatory impact analyses [primary focus of Cecot and Viscusi] and whether the APA should be modified to explicitly authorize courts to review such analyses [primary focus of our previous study]. This paper addresses a problem that both of those prior papers put to the side—to wit, how the precise language used by Congress in imposing regulatory impact analysis requirements affects the thoroughness of the agencies’ factfinding and of the judicial review conducted by the courts.

61. 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (E) (2012). As courts developed the “hard look” doctrine under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard, the “substantial evidence” and “arbitrary and capricious” standards of review have largely converged, and several courts of appeals have suggested that the two standards are effectively indistinguishable when applied to rules. See,
robust cross-section of decisions over a relatively lengthy period (30+ years) and includes opinions reviewing rules promulgated under a wide array of statutes.

We limit our analysis solely to cases in which a litigant has argued that a statute authorizing a particular regulatory action required the agency to conduct some form of economic analysis. As such, we do not consider the handful of decisions dealing with an agency’s compliance with the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, Regulatory Flexibility Act, Paperwork Reduction Act, or a handful of other statutes that direct an agency to analyze a specific aspect of a proposed rule (e.g., its effect on small businesses or on the creation of red tape). We so confine our analysis because we are here interested only in the effects of statutory directives that enshrine economic analysis as one of the central criteria in the agency’s decision of whether and how to regulate (as opposed to statutory directives requiring agencies to modify rules to mitigate their impact on a particular community).

In analyzing the cases, we first reviewed each decision to identify the statutory provision(s) authorizing the agency to promulgate the rule at issue. We have focused specifically on those portions of the statutes directing the agency to conduct some form of economic analysis, including any directive that the agency consider the costs or benefits associated with a contemplated rule. At the highest level of generality, the statutes fall into five overarching categories: (a) requirement that the agency select a specific alternative identified by the benefit–cost analysis (e.g., the least restrictive alternative); (b) requirement that the agency consider specific types of economic benefits or costs enumerated in a statute; (c) more general requirement that the agency consider benefits or costs (without any identification of specific types of benefits or costs); (d) requirement that the agency promulgate a rule that is technologically or economically feasible; and (e) authorization for regulation without any directive to consider (or ignore) regu-

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65. See the Appendix for examples of statutes applying each type of economic analysis standard.
66. In several of the rules analyzed in the following sections, technological and economic feasibility appear to be distinct requirements. In the handful of cases we reviewed for Section II that dealt with a feasibility standard, the relevant statute required the agency to show that the rule was both technologically and economically feasible.
atory benefits or costs.\textsuperscript{67} None of these judicial decisions involved statutes that prohibit the agency from considering costs.\textsuperscript{68}

Next, we reviewed each decision to assess the rigor with which the court examined the agency’s economic analysis in determining if the rule satisfied the relevant statutory standard. We have divided the cases into three categories based on the extensiveness of the court’s review: “detailed,” “intermediate,” or “minimal” (or “indirect,” if the court’s review focused only tangentially on the economic aspects of the rulemaking).\textsuperscript{69} In categorizing cases, we have focused solely on the court’s analysis of the agency’s factfinding regarding the economic aspects of the rule, ignoring the analysis of other aspects of the rulemaking process such as the scientific factfinding, the procedural aspects of the agency’s decision (e.g., whether the agency appropriately sought public comment), and the construction of the underlying statute.

In this light, we excluded a handful of cases that were analyzed in our prior article. Specifically, any case that did not apply Section 706 of the APA was excluded from the sample. For instance, several decisions involved only issues of statutory interpretation (applying the \textit{Chevron} standard) or of compliance with the APA’s procedural strictures (e.g., ensuring an adequate opportunity for public comment). The court’s evaluation of the agency’s economic analysis in these cases was incidental. We also focused solely on cases that examined benefit–cost analyses performed under statutes directing a specific agency (or discrete group of agencies) to consider economic factors when promulgating rules. As such, we excluded cases that dealt solely with analyses mandated by the National Environmental Policy Act or other cross-cutting statutes that impose supplemental analyti-

\textsuperscript{67} In the econometric analysis, rules subject to statutory standards of this sort were not treated as a separate category but rather as a baseline.

\textsuperscript{68} The absence of any such cases in the sample is understandable. Though a court may apply the \textit{Chevron} standard to determine whether an agency properly interpreted a statute to prohibit consideration of costs—compare \textit{Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns}, 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001) (holding that considerations of economic costs can play no part in the determination of national ambient air quality standards, one of the tasks assigned to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean Air Act), with \textit{Michigan v. EPA}, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (holding that the EPA incorrectly interpreted another provision of the Clean Air Act to foreclose consideration of economic costs in the regulation of power plants)—a court would not be in a position to examine an agency’s factfinding under such a statutory standard, except in a case in which an agency improperly made findings concerning regulatory costs and then allowed that evidence to infect other portions of the record.

\textsuperscript{69} One of the authors reviewed all the cases and categorized them in order to ensure a consistent methodology.
The remainder of Section II will explore the rigor of judicial review in cases involving each of the five categories of statutory standards. For each standard, the paper both offers overarching conclusions concerning all the cases in the sample that applied that standard and provides a more detailed analysis of several of the relevant cases, illustrating how the statutory standard ultimately affects the rigor of the court's review. At the end of Section II, there is a discussion of overarching conclusions and of lessons for statutory drafters.

A. Statutes Mandating Selection of a Specific Regulatory Alternative

Our sample of cases included two decisions in which the relevant statute directed an agency to adopt a specific alternative identified by the underlying benefit–cost analysis. In both instances, the reviewing court examined the agency’s economic analysis very carefully, closely parsing the agency’s underlying factfinding to ensure that the agency properly interpreted the evidence and reached a logical conclusion on the basis of the information in the rulemaking record. The cases included one reversal and one affirmance.

The first decision, Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, involved a challenge to a rule issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). In relevant part, TSCA directs the EPA to regulate chemicals posing “an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.” At the time the Corrosion Proof decision was issued, TSCA also contained language (since removed) that required the EPA to “protect adequately against [the] risk” by “using the least burdensome requirement.”

The relevant provision of TSCA also sets forth various factors related to the economic effects of a proposed rule that the agency must consider when promulgating a rule. These factors include the likely effect “of the rule on the national economy, small business, technological innovation, the environment, and public health,” as well as the costs and benefits and cost effic-

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70. The Appendix gives an overview of each of the cases analyzed, setting forth the statutory requirement for conducting economic analysis at issue in each case and then providing a brief analysis of the rigor of review applied by the court to the agency’s factfinding in response to the statute. See infra Appendix.
72. Id. § 2605(a).
73. 947 F.2d 1201, 1214–15 (5th Cir. 1991).
tiveness of the regulatory alternatives the agency considers.\(^{74}\) Finally, the statute provides that a court reviewing the agency’s rule must find that it is supported by “substantial evidence,” a standard of review that is sometimes construed as more searching than the baseline “arbitrary and capricious” standard under the APA.\(^{75}\)

Interpreting this statutory language, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the EPA must determine an “acceptable” level of risk and then adopt the “least burdensome method of reaching that level.”\(^{76}\) As demonstrated in Section II.C, this type of standard is unusually strict. In most cases in which Congress speaks to regulatory benefits and costs, it simply directs the agency to “consider” the economic effects of the rule or to find a “reasonable relationship” between the benefits and costs. Under the version of TSCA applied in \(\textit{Corrosion Proof}\), by contrast, Congress affirmatively directed the agency to adopt the “least burdensome requirement” available.\(^{77}\) As such, the EPA could not satisfy this standard merely by considering economic benefits and costs; it had to show that it selected the alternative that imposed the lowest possible costs on regulated industry.

After articulating the standard the EPA must satisfy, the \(\textit{Corrosion Proof}\) decision engaged in an incredibly rigorous analysis of the agency’s economic factfinding.\(^{78}\) It began by noting that the agency appeared to have adopted the \textit{most} burdensome possible regulation, an outright ban on the production and use of asbestos.\(^{79}\) In so doing, the agency took on a nearly impossible task: in order to satisfy the “least burdensome” standard, it needed to demonstrate that an outright ban was the only possible approach that achieved the regulatory objectives. Pointing to various flaws in the agency’s analysis, the Fifth Circuit held that the EPA had most decidedly not met that heavy burden. Among other things, the agency’s factfinding contained the following errors:


\(^{75}\) \(\text{id}\). § 2618(c)(1)(B)(i).

\(^{76}\) \(\text{Corrosion Proof}\), 947 F.2d at 1215.

\(^{77}\) \(\text{See id. at 1214–15.}\)

\(^{78}\) The court’s highly detailed analysis may derive in part from its belief that the “substantial evidence” standard it was applying required a more rigorous review than the baseline “arbitrary and capricious” standard. \(\text{id. at 1213–14; cf. supra note 61 and accompanying text (citing authorities suggesting that the two standards are equivalent). Though the court may have been less inclined to parse every aspect of the agency’s factfinding were it applying a less searching standard of review, one can likely safely assume that the agency’s failure to demonstrate that it had selected the “least burdensome” alternative would have doomed the regulation even under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard.}\)

\(^{79}\) \(\text{Corrosion Proof}\), 947 F.2d at 1215–16.
• Artificially inflating the benefits of the rule by comparing it to a baseline of zero regulation (as opposed to considering the benefits of a less burdensome regulation than an outright ban)\textsuperscript{80}
• Discounting projected costs without doing the same for benefits\textsuperscript{81}
• Using unquantified benefits (lives saved beyond the year 2000) as a trump card to justify very high costs, even where the agency successfully quantified similar benefits (lives saved prior to the year 2000)\textsuperscript{82}
• Ignoring the risks associated with potential substitutes, many of which are known carcinogens\textsuperscript{83}
• Tolerating very high costs (upward of $70 million for every statistical life saved), which suggested that underlying risk of injury is not “unreasonable”\textsuperscript{84}

So stringent was the Fifth Circuit’s review in the \textit{Corrosion Proof} decision that the case has come to be viewed by many in the administrative law community as a prime specimen of judicial overreach. In a recent article, Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner characterize \textit{Corrosion Proof} as well as \textit{Business Roundtable v. SEC}\textsuperscript{85} (a case analyzed in greater detail below) as forming an “anticanon” of almost universally reviled judicial opinions.\textsuperscript{86} Masur and Posner take up the unpopular task of defending the decision, arguing that the EPA’s economic analysis suffered major flaws and that the Fifth Circuit was correct in striking down the asbestos ban.\textsuperscript{87} We have also spoken favorably of at least certain aspects of the \textit{Corrosion Proof} decision.\textsuperscript{88} Whether the Fifth Circuit reached the correct outcome in \textit{Corrosion Proof} is of little moment to the present discussion. The key takeaway is that the court applied a level of judicial scrutiny that is universally acknowledged to be extremely rigorous.\textsuperscript{89}

\textsuperscript{80.} Id. at 1216–17.
\textsuperscript{81.} Id. at 1218.
\textsuperscript{82.} Id. at 1218–19.
\textsuperscript{83.} Id. at 1221.
\textsuperscript{84.} Id. at 1222–23.
\textsuperscript{85.} 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
\textsuperscript{86.} Masur & Posner, supra note 36, at 953.
\textsuperscript{87.} Id.
\textsuperscript{88.} Bull & Ellig, supra note 2, at 771, 799, 801, 805.
\textsuperscript{89.} By applying such a rigorous standard of review, the courts provide a strong incentive for agencies to engage in very detailed economic analyses of their rules, but aggressive judicial review creates the countervailing risk of regulatory “ossification,” which results when
In so doing, the court was closely guided by the wording of TSCA. The opinion is peppered with references to “unreasonable risk”\(^90\) and the “least burdensome” alternative,\(^91\) evidence that the court took the statutory language very seriously and found various aspects of the agency’s analysis insufficient to meet this high bar. In short, the *Corrosion Proof* decision illustrates how courts applying highly prescriptive and detailed statutory standards will often closely parse the agency’s factfinding to ensure that it has satisfied its mandate.

The other decision applying a highly prescriptive statutory standard, *Center for Auto Safety v. Peck*,\(^92\) also involved a very rigorous judicial analysis of the agency’s rulemaking record, though the court ultimately upheld the agency’s rule.\(^93\) The statutes at issue in the case were the National Traffic Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, which authorized the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to regulate various aspects of automobile production (here, the degree of force a car bumper must withstand), and the Cost Savings Act, which directed the agency to “seek to obtain the maximum feasible reduction of costs to the public and to the consumer” in promulgating its rules under the preceding act.\(^94\) The Cost Savings Act also set forth certain benefits and costs that the agency must

\(^90\) See, e.g., *Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA*, 947 F.2d 1201, 1222–23 (5th Cir. 1991) (analyzing the value of statistical life used by the EPA and suggesting that the excessive regulatory costs imply that the underlying risk is not “unreasonable”).

\(^91\) See, e.g., *id.* at 1220 (“[T]he EPA bears a tough burden indeed to show that under TSCA a ban is the least burdensome alternative . . . .”); *id.* at 1221 (“Considering that many of the substitutes that the EPA itself conceives will be used in the place of asbestos have known carcinogenic effects, the EPA not only cannot assure this court that it has taken the least burdensome alternative, but cannot even prove that its regulations will increase workplace safety.”).

\(^92\) 751 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

\(^93\) See generally *id.*

\(^94\) *Id.* at 1339 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1912(b)(1)). The sections of the Cost Savings Act discussed in the case have since been rescinded by Congress, so this paper cites the version of the statute reprinted in the case.
consider, including the proposed rule’s effects on the costs of insurance, legal fees, and savings related to consumer time and convenience. In a highly detailed opinion that closely analyzed NHTSA’s scientific and economic factfinding, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit considered and rejected various objections to the agency’s method of assessing regulatory costs. Among other things, the court upheld the following components of the agency’s rulemaking analysis:

- Excluding low and high estimates for bumper weight submitted by certain manufacturers
- Rejecting flawed survey data that suggested that the agency underestimated the cost of inconvenience occasioned by being involved in a vehicular accident
- Conducting detailed analysis to decide upon a standard that optimally balanced benefits and costs

In conducting its detailed review, the court did not find the agency’s analysis to be flawless but deemed any errors it uncovered to be harmless. As in Corrosion Proof, the court paid careful attention to the statutory mandate in parsing the agency’s evidence. It spent several pages examining the agency’s cost estimates prior to concluding that the agency satisfied the strict cost minimization standard imposed by the Cost Savings Act. It also considered the agency’s factfinding on matters such as savings related to consumer convenience that the agency was explicitly tasked with analyzing under the act. In short, though the Center for Auto Safety court ultimately upheld the agency’s rule, its analysis was equally as rigorous as that applied by the Corrosion Proof court.

B. Statutes Mandating Consideration of Specific Benefits or Costs

We now consider cases addressing a statute that sets forth specific economic benefits or costs that an agency must consider (rather than simply directing the agency to consider benefits or costs more generally, as do the statutes analyzed in the next subsection). Each of the statutes analyzed in

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95. See id.
96. Id. at 1353.
97. Id. at 1362.
98. Id. at 1362–68.
99. Id. at 1366.
100. Several decisions in the overall sample also featured statutes directing an agency to consider factors other than economic costs and benefits, such as environmental impacts and
Section II.A also enumerated economic benefits and costs the relevant agency must consider in adopting a rule. Since those statutes also directed the agency to adopt a specific regulatory alternative, unlike the statutes discussed in this Subsection, they were analyzed separately.

All told, five decisions involved statutes that enumerate specific economic factors to consider as part of the overall benefit–cost analysis. As a general matter, these cases featured robust analysis by the reviewing court, though the level of scrutiny was somewhat weaker than that seen in the cases examined in the preceding subsection.

Three of the cases arose under a set of statutory provisions requiring the SEC to consider “efficiency,” “competition,” and “capital formation” when promulgating rules. In one of these decisions, *American Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC*, the D.C. Circuit very carefully analyzed the SEC’s factfinding under each of these factors. The case concerned the SEC’s decision to subject fixed indexed annuities to the federal securities laws (determining that they do not qualify for an exception).

The court found the agency’s “competition” analysis inadequate insofar as the agency concluded that the rule would enhance competition by reducing the uncertainty associated with the lack of regulation. Though perhaps true, the agency’s reasoning proves too much: adopting any rule, however unreasonable, would reduce the uncertainty associated with agency inaction. The court also noted that the agency failed to ascertain the level of competition under existing state regulations, thereby failing to establish the baseline necessary to determine if federal regulation was needed to increase competition to acceptable levels. The court found the “efficiency” analysis inadequate for similar reasons. The agency asserted that applying securities laws to fixed indexed annuities would result in greater disclosure and thereby allow investors to make more informed decisions (thereby enhancing overall market efficiency), but it again failed to determine whether state regulation was already achieving the desired effect. Finally, the court rejected the agency’s “capital formation” analysis because it relied on the

consumer safety. Though these factors qualify as “costs” and “benefits,” they are not cast in economic terms. The additional factors enumerated in the statutes analyzed in this Subsection include things such as “efficiency” and “competitiveness,” terms that refer specifically to the economic effects of the rule.

102. 572 F.3d 923 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
103. *See generally id.*
104. *Id.* at 935.
105. *Id.* at 935–36.
106. *Id.* at 936.
same flawed assumptions as the “efficiency” analysis.\textsuperscript{107}

A second decision, \textit{Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. SEC},\textsuperscript{108} struck down an SEC rule that required mutual funds engaged in certain transactions to have a board that consists of at least seventy-five percent independent directors and to have an independent chairman.\textsuperscript{109} Though the \textit{Chamber} court did not parse the statutory language so closely as did the \textit{American Equity} court, it nevertheless held that the statutory terms referring to “competition,” “efficiency,” and “capital formation” required the agency to consider costs that might impede those goals.\textsuperscript{110} In assessing the agency’s examination of costs, the court found various flaws. First, the agency failed to put forth its best efforts in quantifying the magnitude of the rule’s costs; though it may not have been capable of assigning an exact number, it at least could have set forth a range.\textsuperscript{111} The agency also gave short shrift to a possible regulatory alternative, mandating that mutual funds disclose the lack of an independent chairman rather than affirmatively requiring one, notwithstanding the fact that two dissenting commissioners proposed it.\textsuperscript{112}

At the same time, the court deferred to various aspects of the SEC’s decisionmaking. For instance, the court stated that the agency could rely on its own expertise in concluding that independent chairmen provide benefits to mutual funds rather than conducting an empirical study to determine whether that is in fact the case.\textsuperscript{113} Ultimately, the \textit{Chamber} court exhibited a somewhat higher level of deference than the \textit{American Equity} court, striking down the rule as a result of gaping omissions in the agency’s analysis while largely deferring to the agency’s overall decisionmaking methodology.

A third decision, \textit{Business Roundtable v. SEC}, examined an SEC rule requiring public companies to include information in their proxy materials about shareholder-nominated candidates for boards of directors. The rule was subject to the same statutory language referring to “efficiency,” “competition,” and “capital formation” that was at issue in the other two cases. Whether as a result of exasperation at having to correct shoddy analysis by the SEC for the third time in a period of a few years\textsuperscript{114} or simply of exceed-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{107} \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{108} 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
  \item \textsuperscript{109} See generally \textit{id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{110} \textit{Id.} at 144.
  \item \textsuperscript{111} \textit{Id.} at 143–44.
  \item \textsuperscript{112} \textit{Id.} at 144–45.
  \item \textsuperscript{113} \textit{Id.} at 142.
  \item \textsuperscript{114} See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also PAUL ROSE & CHRISTOPHER WALKER, CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS, THE IMPORTANCE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 33 (2013),
\end{itemize}
ingly close scrutiny by the courts under the relevant statutory provision, the court engaged in a very searching review of the agency’s economic factfinding. Indeed, as noted previously, many administrative law scholars have come to the consensus that the D.C. Circuit went too far in the Business Roundtable decision, overstepping the court’s proper role in assessing an agency’s rulemaking under the nominally forgiving “arbitrary and capricious” standard. Among the many flaws in the SEC’s rule identified by the court are the following:

- Ignoring the costs that companies would likely incur in opposing shareholder-nominated candidates
- Improperly dismissing studies that suggested that firms run by shareholder-nominated candidates underperform firms that are not and relying on less persuasive studies that suggested the opposite
- Discounting the rule’s costs but not its benefits
- Failing to address the possibility that unions and pension funds would use the rule to achieve goals unrelated to maximizing corporate profitability
- Tolerating internal analytical inconsistencies, such as estimating a high rate of invocation of the rule for assessing benefits and a low rate for assessing costs

As in Chamber, the Business Roundtable court did not focus as closely as the American Equity court on the actual language of the statute, instead pointing to logical flaws in the agency’s benefit–cost analysis. Nevertheless, the highly rigorous review suggests that the court interpreted the relevant statute as providing authority to carefully parse the agency’s rule and require the agency to conduct a more thorough factfinding on remand.

Another decision in this category of cases, Investment Company Institute v.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, is considerably more deferential to the agency’s factfinding than the other decisions analyzed. The case concerned a rule by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) that expanded the number of firms subject to the agency’s rules. In issuing the rule, the CFTC was required to comply with a statute that directs it to consider regulatory costs and benefits and enumerates several specific benefits and costs the agency must consider (including the efficiency, competitiveness, and financial integrity of futures markets; price discovery; and sound risk management practices).

The court summarily upheld several aspects of the agency’s factfinding. It rejected a challenge that the agency failed to take into account the effect of existing regulations, noting that the CFTC carefully demonstrated the marginal benefits its rule provides. The court also observed that the agency analyzed each of the costs and benefits enumerated under the statute, rejecting a challenge based on “hypothetical costs that may never arise.” Finally, the court rejected the argument that the agency must quantify benefits and costs, noting that Congress has explicitly called for quantification when it intends to impose that requirement. In short, though the court exhibited a greater willingness to summarily defer to the agency’s conclusions than did any of the previous decisions, it nevertheless demonstrated great solicitude for the language of the statute and ensured that the agency gave proper consideration to each of the factors listed therein.

The final decision in this group of cases, Natural Resources Defense Council v. Herrington, dealt with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (ECPA), a statute that required the Department of Energy to set energy efficiency standards at the highest level that is technologically feasible and economically justified and that set forth several specific economic factors the agency must consider in making that determination (e.g., economic impact on product manufacturers and consumers, projected energy savings). The statute also provided for judicial review of the agency’s determination un-

121. 720 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
122. See generally id.
125. Id. at 378.
126. See id. at 379.
127. 768 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
129. See id. § 6295.
der the substantial evidence standard.\textsuperscript{130}

Over the course of several dozens of pages, the D.C. Circuit engaged in an incredibly detailed analysis of the agency’s justification for energy efficiency standards relating to eight different appliances.\textsuperscript{131} The court concluded that several of the agency’s underlying assumptions were unjustified and that it overgeneralized in reaching its conclusions.\textsuperscript{132} The court also pointed to specific flaws in the agency’s analysis, such as using an excessively high discount rate without adequate justification,\textsuperscript{133} even as it overlooked other errors that it considered harmless.\textsuperscript{134} In short, the court applied a level of scrutiny similar to that seen in the trio of recent SEC cases.

C. Statutes Mandating that the Agency Consider Benefits or Costs

In the sample of cases analyzed, the most common statutory directive by far was some mandate to “consider” regulatory costs and, in some cases, regulatory benefits. The statutes that we examined feature several permutations of that basic standard, including (a) a requirement to consider both benefits and costs (which courts sometimes interpret as implicitly requiring the agency to find a reasonable relationship between benefits and costs); (b) a requirement to consider costs (without any explicit mention of benefits); and (c) a requirement to set a “reasonable” or “practicable” standard, which implies that the agency is to give some consideration to regulatory benefits and costs.

Among the cases arising from statutes featuring one of these standards, the rigor of judicial review varied widely from case to case. Some decisions applied a level of scrutiny every bit as exacting as that observed in the more demanding decisions discussed in the previous subsections, whereas others exhibited a very high degree of deference to the agency’s factfinding. Interestingly, the precise verbal formulation in the statute of interest did not appear to make much of a difference, nor did the existence of previous judicial precedents interpreting a benefit–cost “consideration” requirement as a mandate to find some reasonable relationship between the two. As the chart in the Appendix makes clear, cases applying each of the permutations of a benefit–cost consideration requirement run the gamut from highly detailed review to highly deferential.

The courts also exhibited much less solicitude for the precise language of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{130} Id. § 6306(b)(2).
\item \textsuperscript{131} See Herrington, 768 F.2d at 1410–25.
\item \textsuperscript{132} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{133} Id. at 1412–14.
\item \textsuperscript{134} See, e.g., id. at 1418.
\end{itemize}
the statute than was the case in the decisions examined in Sections II.A and II.B. As a matter of logic, this result is not terribly surprising, as none of the permutations of the benefit–cost consideration requirement give the court much of a standard to apply. As long as there is some evidence that the agency actually grappled with evidence concerning the economic effects of the rule, the agency has presumably satisfied the “consideration” requirement. The rigor of review therefore depends entirely on how closely the court wishes to parse the agency’s evidence. In some instances, the court carefully examines the evidence to ensure that the agency did not commit any significant errors in its assessment of benefits and costs and that it did not reach an irrational conclusion in light of the evidence before it. In other cases, the court simply describes what the agency did and announces that it will defer to the agency’s determination without any additional explanation. The remainder of this Subsection will review representative samples of cases under each of the permutations of the benefit–cost consideration standard, providing examples of relatively detailed and relatively forgiving review for each.

1. Benefit–Cost Consideration (With or Without a “Reasonable Relationship” Requirement)

In several of the decisions, the underlying statute requires the agency to consider both benefits and costs, and the court interprets that language as requiring that the agency find a reasonable relationship between the benefits and costs. The precise dimensions of a “reasonable relationship” are never fleshed out in any detail. For instance, no decision articulates the exact level of disproportion between benefits and costs that will lead a particular rule to be deemed arbitrary and capricious. Rather, the court simply scrutinizes the economic evidence undergirding the rule and ensures that the agency provided some explanation for why it believes the benefits justify the costs.

In *Quivira Mining Co. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission*,135 the court very closely parsed the evidence from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), though it ultimately upheld the agency’s rule. Interestingly, the statutory provision at issue referred only to costs, requiring the agency to provide “due consideration of the economic costs” when promulgating rules dealing with treatment of uranium tailings in nuclear power plants.136 Relying in part on the legislative history of the relevant statutory provision,

135. 866 F.2d 1246 (10th Cir. 1989).
The court interpreted this language as imposing a “benefit–cost rationalization” standard, which requires the agency to show that costs and benefits are “reasonably related.” The court then proceeded to apply that standard, carefully discussing the benefits and costs the agency weighed and assessing the agency’s efforts to balance the costs against the benefits for each aspect of its rulemaking. The court considered and rejected various challenges to the agency’s methodology, ultimately concluding that the approach the agency took was perfectly rational, if not ideal in every respect. For example, the court noted that the agency failed to consider the cost of land that regulated parties would be required to purchase to meet the rule’s requirements, but it concluded that this error was harmless as the land at issue was located in remote areas and was likely to be very inexpensive.

The rigor of review applied in Quíñera contrasts starkly with that in two cases applying a similar statutory standard. These decisions, both titled American Mining Congress v. Thomas, were companion cases decided simultaneously by the Tenth Circuit. As in Quíñera, the cases involved the treatment of uranium tailings, though the statute at issue dealt with the EPA’s (rather than the NRC’s) role in regulating the problem. The relevant statutory language was quite similar to that applicable to the NRC, directing the EPA to consider “environmental and economic costs” when setting standards. As in Quíñera, the court looked to the legislative history and held that the statute at issue required the agency to find a “reasonable relationship” between benefits and costs (notwithstanding the fact that the precise statutory language refers only to costs).

American Mining I contained most of the court’s analysis in applying that standard. After dismissing various technical challenges to the agency’s rule, the court addressed the question of whether the EPA found a “rea-

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137. Quíñera, 866 F.2d at 1250. The court distinguished “cost-benefit rationalization” from the stricter “cost-benefit optimization” standard. The latter “requires quantification of costs and benefits and a mathematical balancing of the two to determine the optimum result.” Id.
138. Id. at 1254–58, 1260.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1257.
141. Am. Mining Cong. v. Thomas (American Mining I), 772 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1985); Am. Mining Cong. v. Thomas (American Mining II), 772 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1985).
143. American Mining I, 772 F.2d at 631–32.
144. Id. at 632–36.
sonable” relationship between the regulatory benefits and costs. The court simply recited the agency’s conclusions and then asserted that they were “reasonable” with little to no additional discussion. For instance, the court noted that the final standard permitted radiation levels ten times greater than the original standard, but simply asserted that this judgment was “within a zone of reasonableness.” Similarly, though the court noted that the overall costs imposed by the rule were quite significant ($314 million), it suggested that Congress was aware that the costs would be high and summarily deferred to the agency’s judgment.

*American Mining II*, in turn, largely relied on the reasoning in *American Mining I*. The court again entertained the argument that the regulatory costs were too high for the benefits achieved and again summarily deferred to the agency, reemphasizing that Congress was aware of the likelihood of significant costs when it tasked the EPA with drafting rules. Though *American Mining I* and *II* both defer almost completely to the agency’s judgment, it is difficult to fault the court in light of the vague statutory standard at play: Congress merely directed the EPA to “consider” the costs (and, by implication, the benefits), and the EPA clearly satisfied that mandate, making explicit findings as to both benefits and costs and explaining why the former justified the latter. Nevertheless, the contrast to the *Quivira* case, in which the court carefully assessed the agency’s reasoning and grappled with and rejected each of the challenger’s arguments, is striking. Given that both cases derive from what is effectively the same statutory standard, this contrast provides a stark illustration of the degree to which the rigor of review under a benefit–cost consideration standard depends on any given court’s appetite for closely parsing the evidence.

In other cases, the relevant statute directs the agency to consider benefits and costs, and the court is silent as to whether the agency must find a “reasonable relationship” between the two. Given the nearly infinite malleability of the “reasonable relationship” standard seen in the preceding cases, one would not expect the judicial analysis under this set of decisions to differ much from that under the previous set, and the actual cases bear out this intuition. *Radio Ass’n on Defending Airwave Rights v. United States Department of Transportation* stands at the highly deferential end of the spectrum. The

145. *Id.* at 632.
146. *Id.* at 638.
147. *Id.* at 637.
148. *Id.* at 638.
149. *American Mining II*, 772 F.2d 640, 646 (10th Cir. 1985).
150. 47 F.3d 794 (6th Cir. 1995).
relevant statutes, the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 and the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984, required the Federal Highway Administration to conduct a benefit–cost analysis prior to issuing its rule banning the use of radar detectors in commercial vehicles.\textsuperscript{151} The petitioners had raised various objections to the agency’s benefit–cost analysis, contending that it had ignored costs incurred by states and that it failed to provide a factual basis for its assumption that a radar ban would reduce the incidence and severity of vehicular accidents.\textsuperscript{152} The court summarily rejected these arguments, merely reciting the agency’s responses and indicating that it performed “some type of cost-benefit analysis” and thereby satisfied the statutory mandate.\textsuperscript{153}

\textit{Gas Appliance Manufacturers Ass’n v. United States Department of Energy} \textsuperscript{154} is at the opposite end of the spectrum. The Energy Conservation Standards for New Buildings Act (ECSNBA) directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to issue energy efficiency standards while taking due account of “economic cost and benefit.”\textsuperscript{155} Applying that law, the DOE issued a rule dealing with heat loss standards for water heaters.\textsuperscript{156}

Prior to delving into the rulemaking record, the D.C. Circuit observed that the relevant statute directed the DOE to consider a number of noneconomic factors in addition to economic benefits and costs, including “energy efficiency,” “stimulation of use of nondepletable sources of energy,” “institutional resources,” “habitability,” and “impact upon affected groups.”\textsuperscript{157} Of these factors, the court concluded that “economic benefits and costs” was the only one that lent itself to detailed judicial review, and it asserted that “any override of a negative cost/benefit analysis would seem to require a very careful justification.”\textsuperscript{158} Though the court did not elaborate on what a “negative cost/benefit analysis” would entail (possible options would include failure to maximize net benefits or issuance of a rule in which the monetized costs exceed the monetized benefits), the opinion seems to imply that the agency bears a fairly heavy burden for justifying its rule, imposing a standard more akin to that seen in the cases analyzed in

\textsuperscript{151.} \textit{Id.} at 805. The statutory provisions at issue in the case have been rescinded by Congress since the opinion was issued, so this paper cites to the court’s decision rather than the U.S. Code.

\textsuperscript{152.} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{153.} \textit{Id.} at 806.

\textsuperscript{154.} 998 F.2d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

\textsuperscript{155.} \textit{Id.} at 1043. As in the previous case, the relevant statutory provision has since been rescinded, so this paper again cites to the decision rather than the U.S. Code.

\textsuperscript{156.} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{157.} \textit{Id.} at 1043–45.

\textsuperscript{158.} \textit{Id.} at 1045.
Precisely how the court wrung such an exacting standard out of the vague statutory language of the ECSNBA, which contains a benefit–cost consideration requirement that closely resembles that seen in the other cases in this Subsection, is unclear. In this respect, the case effectively illustrates how benefit–cost consideration mandates provide little guidance to the courts about Congress's intent. Including such a provision clearly signals to the courts that economic analysis is somehow relevant to the agency’s decision and that the agency must present some evidence on regulatory benefits and costs, but the court is then free to impose a standard ranging from benefit–cost optimization (as the D.C. Circuit seems to be applying here) to per se deference to the agency’s conclusions (which is roughly the standard applied in Radio Association).

Applying this rigorous benefit–cost optimization standard, the D.C. Circuit easily found the DOE’s economic analysis inadequate. The court engaged in a detailed review of various aspects of the agency’s technical and economic factfinding, but the fundamental flaw in the agency’s analysis boiled down to its failure to demonstrate precisely how an actual water heater could achieve the energy conservation targets that the agency’s computer model predicted were attainable. The agency also assumed without any explanation that production costs in the residential and commercial markets were the same. Though these rather egregious errors in the agency’s analysis may have proved fatal even if the court had not announced a strict benefit–cost balancing requirement, the rigor with which the court reviewed the rulemaking record stands in stark contrast to the Radio Association case.

2. Cost Consideration Requirement

Two of the decisions we studied involved statutes directing the agency to consider regulatory costs, making no mention of regulatory benefits. The first such decision, New York v. Reilly, featured a fairly rigorous review of the agency’s factfinding. Among other things, the case involved a decision by the EPA not to ban the burning of lead-acid batteries. The relevant provision of the Clean Air Act directed the EPA to adopt the “best” system of emission reduction that has been “adequately demonstrated” while “taking account of the cost.” Though the court upheld certain aspects of the

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159. Id. at 1046–47.
160. Id. at 1047–48.
161. 969 F.2d 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
agency’s rule, it struck down the decision not to regulate the burning of lead-acid batteries.\textsuperscript{163} In so doing, the court faulted the agency for considering only the most extreme regulatory alternatives (i.e., failure to regulate and an outright ban), directing the agency to consider less restrictive alternatives on remand.\textsuperscript{164}

In addition to illustrating relatively stringent judicial review in response to a fairly open-ended statutory cost-consideration requirement, the \textit{Reilly} decision is also interesting insofar as it shows a court reading additional analytical requirements into a statutory provision that only explicitly mentions costs. In essence, the \textit{Reilly} court faulted the EPA for failing to consider an adequate range of regulatory alternatives and for placing excessive emphasis on costs while overlooking potentially large benefits. Consideration of alternatives and weighing costs against benefits are important elements of a full regulatory impact analysis,\textsuperscript{165} but the statute only speaks to costs. As in \textit{Gas Appliance}, the \textit{Reilly} court shows that courts sometimes interpret vague statutory directives to consider benefits or costs as requiring a full-blown benefit–cost analysis of both the regulation adopted and the key alternatives.

\textit{Florida Manufactured Housing Ass’n v. Cisneros},\textsuperscript{166} by contrast, demonstrates a very high level of deference under a similar statute. The case concerned wind resistance standards for manufactured homes issued by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).\textsuperscript{167} The relevant statute directed HUD to consider a number of factors in promulgating these standards, including any regulation’s effects on “the cost of the manufactured home to the public.”\textsuperscript{168} Prior to delving into the record evidence, the court considered a claim that HUD improperly considered certain benefits of the regulation (including minimization of property damage caused by flying debris peeling off mobile homes during a storm) in addition to the increased costs for mobile homes, since the statute refers only to the latter.\textsuperscript{169} Like the \textit{Reilly} court, the Eleventh Circuit took an expansive view of the factors the agency might consider under the statute, though its liberal interpre-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{163} \textit{Reilly}, 969 F.2d at 1153.
\item \textsuperscript{164} \textit{Id}.
\item \textsuperscript{165} Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1(b), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,735–36 (Oct. 4, 1993); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4 § E (Sept. 17, 2003); Bull & Ellig, supra note 2, at 731–37.
\item \textsuperscript{166} 53 F.3d 1565 (11th Cir. 1995).
\item \textsuperscript{167} \textit{Id} at 1568–69.
\item \textsuperscript{168} \textit{Id} at 1569. As in several previous cases, the statutory provision at issue has since been rescinded, so this paper quotes the case rather than the U.S. Code.
\item \textsuperscript{169} \textit{Id} at 1577.
\end{itemize}
tation here had the effect of expanding the agency’s discretion rather than constraining it.\footnote{170.
\textit{Id.} at 1577–78.}

In reviewing HUD’s factfinding, the court entertained and summarily rejected various objections to the agency’s cost calculations. The court dismissed a claim that HUD relied on flawed cost data, asserting that the agency was entitled to rely on its own experts rather than those quoted in the materials furnished by the challengers.\footnote{171.
\textit{Id.} at 1580.} It also briefly described the evidence proffered by the challengers and concluded that none of it was sufficient to demonstrate any clear error in the agency’s analysis.\footnote{172.
\textit{Id.} at 1578–81.}

Though \textit{Reilly} and \textit{Florida Manufactured} differ in terms of the rigor of review with which the court parses the agency’s factfinding, both cases stand for the proposition that statutory requirements to consider costs are often interpreted broadly, permitting and in some instances requiring agencies to perform a more thorough regulatory impact analysis that considers regulatory alternatives and benefits as well as costs.\footnote{173.
Of course, a directive to consider “costs” may simply serve as shorthand directing agencies to deploy economic analysis to assess its proposed regulations. For instance, the fact that a statute enumerates certain benefits may serve as an implicit directive to assess those benefits economically along with the costs. Nevertheless, it is striking that the courts read such statutes expansively to create a de facto regulatory impact analysis requirement rather than limiting the statutes to their literal terms.}

3. “Reasonableness” or “Practicability” Requirement

The final group of cases involves statutes that direct an agency to adopt a “reasonable” or “practicable” standard, which courts often interpret as imposing some form of benefit–cost analysis requirement. The sample set included two such decisions, one of which involved fairly rigorous review and one of which did not.

\textit{Public Citizen, Inc. v. Mineta}\footnote{174.
340 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2003).} featured relatively stringent review by the court. The case involved a standard for monitoring tire pressure.\footnote{175.
\textit{Id.} at 43.} The relevant statute directed NHTSA to adopt standards that are “reasonable, practicable, and appropriate,” including no additional language on regulatory benefits or costs.\footnote{176.
49 U.S.C. \textsection\textsection 30111(a)–(b) (2012).} The agency ultimately adopted a standard that its benefit–cost analysis found to be less expensive than an alternative ap-
proach, but that also provided fewer benefits than the alternative. The court faulted the agency’s excessive focus on cost, asserting that a more protective alternative approach was “more cost effective” (i.e., the dollar cost per life saved or injury prevented would be smaller). The court also criticized the agency for overlooking the potential technology-forcing effect of the more stringent standard, suggesting that the compliance costs were likely to diminish over time.

The Public Citizen court may well have reached the better conclusion and more faithfully carried out congressional intent by directing the agency to reconsider the more stringent standard, but the decision comes perilously close to substituting the court’s preferred policy outcome for that of the agency. Nothing in the underlying statute speaks of requiring the agency to adopt the “most cost effective” alternative. Though selecting the least costly option may have been a poor decision from a public policy perspective, it requires a fairly aggressive reading of the statute to conclude that the agency’s decision was not “reasonable” and therefore was “arbitrary and capricious.” Thus, Public Citizen further illustrates the enormous malleability of benefit–cost consideration requirements, which seem to provide a blank canvas on which the court can paint whatever benefit–cost balancing standard it deems appropriate.

Continuing the theme of wildly divergent standards of review, the other decision interpreting a “reasonableness/practicability” requirement, National Truck Equipment Ass’n v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, undertook a very forgiving analysis of the agency’s economic factfinding. The case involved a NHTSA rule strengthening the requirements for passenger compartment roofs in certain vehicles. The relevant statute was the same provision at issue in Public Citizen, which directed the agency to adopt “reasonable, practicable, and appropriate” automobile safety standards. The challengers asserted that the standard NHTSA adopted was not “practicable” because it imposed excessive costs on certain regulated parties that alter mass-produced vehicles. The court gave this argument fairly short shrift, noting that the agency had designed the rule with certain flexibilities designed to minimize costs for companies that modify mass-produced cars

177. Public Citizen, 340 F.3d at 56–57.
178. Id. at 58 (“The notion that ‘cheapest is best’ is contrary to State Farm.”).
179. Id. at 59–60.
180. 711 F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2013).
181. Id. at 663–64, 669 (citing 49 U.S.C. §§ 30111(a)–(b)).
182. Id. at 671.
and summarily concluding that those concessions were adequate. 183

The contrast between the *Public Citizen* and *National Truck* decisions is striking, especially because both cases applied the same statutory standard. Whereas *National Truck* completely deferred to the agency’s judgment, acknowledging that the agency’s decision would increase costs but asserting that it is within the agency’s jurisdiction to do so, *Public Citizen* overturned an agency’s decision to select a regulatory alternative the court deemed suboptimal. These widely divergent results demonstrate the amorphousness of the “reasonableness/practicability” standard.

**D. Technological and Economic Feasibility**

“Technological feasibility” and “economic feasibility” are conceptually distinct standards, though statutes often require agencies to satisfy both standards prior to regulating. “Technological feasibility” refers to the ability of regulated parties to meet a particular standard in light of the current state of technology: if the technology that would enable a regulated entity to satisfy any given regulatory requirement does not yet exist, then the regulation is not “technologically feasible.” 184 “Economic feasibility” refers to the ability of the regulated industry to absorb the costs of a regulation: if a rule is so strict that it would bankrupt a large number of firms and thereby devastate a sector of the economy, it is not “economically feasible.” 185

Under the latter standard, the focus is not on whether the monetized benefits exceed the monetized costs. Indeed, a rule may qualify as “economically feasible” even if the costs outstrip the benefits by several orders of magnitude, or it may be economically infeasible even if the societal benefits exceed the costs to industry. Rather, the focus is solely on whether the costs are too high for market players to continue to operate.

Statutes do not always combine technological and economic feasibility. 186 Many statutes impose one standard or the other, and several statutes combine one of those standards with an additional benefit–cost consideration requirement. The judicial decisions in our sample, however, all involved statutes that combined technological and economic feasibility.

As in the case of benefit–cost consideration requirements, the rigor of review varied significantly from case to case. Certain courts latched on to the

183. Id. at 672–74.
186. See infra Table 1.
economic feasibility prong and effectively treated it as a de facto benefit–cost analysis requirement. Other courts largely deferred to the agency’s analysis, ensuring that the agency presented some evidence of economic costs and benefits but deferring to the agency’s weighing of that evidence. Interestingly, none of the cases dedicated much attention to what it means for a regulation to be “economically feasible.” None of the cases dealt with evidence concerning whether a particular rule would bankrupt an industry. Ultimately, the cases closely resembled those applying a benefit–cost consideration standard, meaning that some cases took a fairly hard look at the agency’s economic evidence to ensure that the agency did not commit any logical errors, whereas others deferred almost completely to the agency’s judgment.

The cases in the sample feature three decisions addressing precisely the same problem: whether setting a higher automobile fuel economy standard will induce manufacturers to produce smaller cars, which will in turn increase the rate of injuries and fatalities because small cars tend to fare poorly in automobile accidents. The three opinions provide a perfect case study in the malleability of the technological and economic feasibility standards, as the three decisions (all issued by different panels of the D.C. Circuit) reached very different conclusions. Specifically, one panel struck down the agency’s decision to set a higher standard, citing the increased safety risk, whereas the other two panels upheld the agency’s rule.

All three decisions involved a provision of the ECPA known as the Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards. The statute set a baseline fuel economy standard of 27.5 miles per gallon (mpg) and required NHTSA to set the “maximum feasible average fuel economy level,” which might entail moving that target up or down. The statute further specified that NHTSA must adopt a standard that is “technologically feasible” and “economically practicable.” NHTSA ultimately decided to reduce the 1987–

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187. This is not to say that no such cases exist, only that none of the cases in our sample applied the “economic feasibility” standard in that manner. Indeed, we have identified several cases outside of our sample in which a court parses the agency’s economic factfinding to determine if the standard adopted would bankrupt the industry. See, e.g., Am. Iron & Steel, 939 F.2d at 986, 992; United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1272, 1281–92 (D.C. Cir. 1980). This further illustrates the inconsistency in the standards that different courts apply when analyzing agency regulations promulgated under an “economic feasibility” standard.


1988 standard to 26 mpg, reduce the 1989 standard to 26.5 mpg, and leave the 27.5 mpg standard in place for 1990.190

The D.C. Circuit first reviewed this regulation in a decision issued in 1990 (which will be referred to as Competitive Enterprise I, as each of the three cases was titled Competitive Enterprise Institute v. NHTSA). In that decision, the Competitive Enterprise Institute challenged NHTSA’s 1987–1988 and 1989 fuel economy standards, arguing that the agency should have reduced the target even further in order to protect against the risk of manufacturers producing smaller (and less safe) cars.191 The court disagreed, asserting that the record evidence was equivocal and that the agency grappled with the potential problem of downsizing and adequately explained why the risk was tolerable.192 For example, the agency presented evidence that the rate of automobile fatalities had declined over time, notwithstanding the fact that many manufacturers had produced smaller cars.193 It also noted that the petitioner’s evidence contained internal flaws and inconsistencies.194 The court therefore upheld the agency’s standards for 1987–1988 and 1989.195

A couple of years later, the D.C. Circuit revisited the same issue in a challenge to NHTSA’s 1990 fuel economy standards. This time, whether a result of sloppier factfinding by the agency or more rigorous judicial review, the court did not find the agency’s explanation convincing.196 The court described the agency’s factfinding as “statistical legerdemain” and indicated that the agency “made conclusory assertions that its decision had no safety cost at all.”197 The court briefly acknowledged Competitive Enterprise I and suggested (with little to no explanation) that the agency’s factfinding for the 1987–1988 and 1989 standards was more thorough.198


190. Competitive Enterprise II, 956 F.2d at 323; Competitive Enterprise I, 901 F.2d at 110.
192. Id. at 120–22.
193. Id. at 121. The court did not consider whether automobile fatalities may have declined even further had manufacturers not moved to producing a smaller fleet of vehicles. In Competitive Enterprise II, by contrast, the court explicitly addressed that problem and faulted the agency for failing to consider the effects of higher fuel economy standards in isolation from other variables. 956 F.2d at 325–27.
194. Competitive Enterprise I, 901 F.2d at 121.
195. Id. at 124.
196. See Competitive Enterprise II, 956 F.2d at 324. The panel of D.C. Circuit judges that heard the first case (Wald, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Douglas Ginsburg) did not feature any overlap with the panel that decided the second case (Mikva, Williams, and Thomas).
197. Id.
198. Id.
Notwithstanding the *Competitive Enterprise II* court’s efforts to distinguish the facts of *Competitive Enterprise I*, the second panel appears to have applied a much more rigorous standard of review. For instance, whereas the first panel accepted the agency’s argument that certain improvements in vehicle safety would compensate for any reductions in safety caused by a shift to smaller cars, the second panel repeatedly faulted the agency for making such an argument, observing that it completely ignored the additional gains in safety that might emerge from setting a lower fuel economy target.\(^{199}\)

Though the agency may have been lulled into complacency by the original win and put forth less effort in justifying its 1990 standards, it also seems that the court applied a closer level of scrutiny in *Competitive Enterprise II*.

Following the remand, NHTSA conducted additional factfinding on the effects of higher fuel economy standards on the size and safety of cars.\(^{200}\) During the rulemaking, no manufacturer presented evidence suggesting that a higher fuel economy standard would reduce the production of or increase the price of larger, safer cars.\(^{201}\) In reviewing the agency’s reissued rule, the D.C. Circuit faulted the agency for inadequately distinguishing a study that suggested that increased fuel economy standards would lead manufacturers to produce smaller cars, but it pointed to the lack of any evidence from manufacturers as sufficient justification for the agency to conclude that such a result would not occur in the real world, and it upheld the agency’s rule.\(^{202}\)

As this trio of decisions illustrates, even the same court applying an identical statutory provision to a series of standards addressing an identical problem can reach very different conclusions. Though NHTSA’s 1990 standard appears to have suffered from somewhat shoddy analysis vis-à-vis the 1987–1988 and 1989 standards, the *Competitive Enterprise II* panel also seems to have applied a much more searching standard of review than either the earlier or later panels.

The decisions also illustrate a phenomenon that arose in the other cases in the sample that applied a feasibility standard. In our sample, courts reviewing a rule for “economic feasibility” tend to parse the agency’s economic analysis as if they were applying a benefit–cost consideration standard, rather than searching for evidence of whether the rule will bankrupt the industry. The level of deference ranges from fairly low (e.g., *Competitive

\(^{199}\) See *Competitive Enterprise I*, 901 F.2d at 119–20.


\(^{201}\) *Id.* at 483.

\(^{202}\) *Id.* at 484–86.
Enterprise II] to quite high (Competitive Enterprise I), but the cases in the sample are fairly uniform in treating “economic feasibility” as some form of a benefit–cost consideration requirement (though not necessarily a requirement that benefits must exceed costs).

E. Statutes with No Mention of Benefits or Costs

The final two cases in the sample involved statutes that made no mention of benefits or costs, nor did they include words such as “reasonableness” or “practicability” that imply a requirement to consider benefits or costs. In both instances, the agency chose to cite economic evidence in support of its rule, and the courts addressed that evidence, notwithstanding the lack of any statutory mandate to consider it. Both courts also exhibited a very high level of deference, policing against any irrational conclusions or clear flaws in the data cited but otherwise affording the agency significant leeway in deciding how to use the evidence.

The first such decision, Charter Communications, Inc. v. FCC, concerned an FCC decision not to rescind a rule that prohibited cable operators from offering set-top converter boxes that bundle security and nonsecurity functions. The relevant statute directed the FCC to “assure the commercial availability” of certain devices to allow users to access multichannel video programming. It made no mention of regulatory benefits or costs. In its rulemaking, the FCC decided that the evidence concerning the costs of the ban was equivocal, that those costs were likely to diminish over time, and that there were significant benefits associated with promoting competition in the market for access devices. The court simply recited those arguments and concluded without any additional discussion that the agency’s decision was reasonable.

The second decision, Consumer Electronics Ass’n v. FCC, involved an FCC rule that mandated that new television sets larger than thirteen inches contain a device allowing them to receive both over-the-air and digital television signals. The relevant statute simply authorized the FCC to require that televisions include an “apparatus” capable of “receiving all frequencies

203. 460 F.3d 31, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The overall goal of the regulation was to promote market competition by enabling third parties to sell devices that allow users to access multichannel programming. Id. at 42.
205. Charter Commc’ns, 460 F.3d at 41–42.
206. Id.
207. 347 F.3d 291 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
208. Id. at 293.
allocated by the [FCC] to television broadcasting."209 Like the previous statute, it said nothing of benefits or costs. The challenger objected to the FCC’s calculation of the costs imposed by requiring digital tuners.210 While acknowledging that the agency’s cost calculations were “hardly a model of thorough consideration,” the court concluded that the agency’s analysis met the minimum standards of rationality.211 In essence, the agency concluded, based on past experience, that the costs of digital tuners would decline rapidly over time.212 Though the agency cited little evidence suggesting that was likely to occur in this case, other than its experience with past innovations, the court deferred to the agency’s judgment.213 The court also summarily stated that it would not disrupt the agency’s balancing of benefits and costs.214

F. Overall Conclusions

The case law analysis supports several overarching conclusions. First, courts take specific statutory language very seriously: when agencies are directed to select a regulatory alternative favored by benefit–cost analysis or given a detailed list of economic benefits and costs to consider, the courts closely review the record to ensure that the agencies have successfully carried out their statutory mandate.215 Nearly all the cases featuring either of these types of statutes closely parsed the record, regardless of whether the court ultimately upheld or vacated the agency’s decision.

Second, when confronted with statutes that broadly direct agencies to consider benefits or costs or that task agencies with writing regulations if

209. 47 U.S.C. § 303(s).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 302–03.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 303–04.
215. This conclusion accords with that reached by Caroline Cecot and Kip Viscusi in their analysis of judicial review of benefit–cost analysis: more detailed statutory standards tend to produce more rigorous judicial review. Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 7, at 593–94, 599–600; see also Masur & Posner, supra note 36, at 953–68 (presenting two prominent examples of intensive judicial scrutiny of agency benefit–cost analysis for regulations that were both issued under statutes that required agencies to choose the least burdensome alternative or perform a benefit–cost test); Sunstein, supra note 36, at 11–14 (juxtaposing courts’ differing approaches in Michigan v. EPA, which concerned a regulation that was not issued under a statute requiring benefit–cost analysis, and Business Roundtable, which concerned a regulation that was issued under a statute the court interpreted to require benefit–cost analysis).
doing so is “economically feasible,” the courts treat the standard as an open invitation to apply as rigorous or lax a review as they deem appropriate. In many instances, the court goes well beyond the precise language of the statute. For example, as explored above, statutory requirements to consider costs are generally interpreted as implicitly requiring some consideration of benefits as well. 216 Similarly, though few statutes explicitly refer to comparing the benefits and costs associated with the preferred regulatory option to those of key alternatives, numerous decisions require the agency to do so. 217 And in cases in our sample involving an “economic feasibility” requirement, the courts generally conduct the same type of review that is seen in cases involving a benefit–cost consideration requirement rather than looking for evidence of whether a particular rule will bankrupt an industry. 218

Cases examining rules issued under a benefit–cost consideration or feasibility standard also tend to run the gamut in terms of rigor of review. Of the opinions in the sample, many applied a level of review every bit as searching as that seen in cases involving stricter statutory standards, whereas others deferred almost completely to the agency. Third, in instances in which the statute says nothing of benefits or costs, the courts will review any economic evidence actually cited by the agency, notwithstanding the lack of any statutory directive to produce such evidence. Nevertheless, in such cases the courts tender a very high level of deference to the agency’s decisionmaking and will not overturn the agency’s conclusions absent overwhelming evidence of some material error. 219

III. STATUTORY DIRECTIVES AND AGENCY ACTIONS

Section II found that courts consistently examine agency economic analysis most carefully when the statute specifies how the agency should use that

216. See supra Section II.C.2.
218. See supra Section IID.
219. Admittedly, the sample size consists of only two decisions, which limits one’s ability to draw definitive conclusions. Nevertheless, the two examples cited amply demonstrate that courts will at least sometimes review evidence of a regulation’s economic impacts even when an agency is not required to produce such evidence. And there is every reason to believe that courts will generally tender a high degree of deference when so doing, as there is no statutory standard for the court to apply other than the general prohibition on the agency’s acting arbitrarily or capriciously. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (noting that judicial review is unavailable when a statute is written in such broad terms that there is no law to apply).
analysis to choose among alternatives or lists specific economic benefit and cost factors the agency must consider. The rigor of the courts’ assessments varies widely when the statute contains more general requirements to consider benefits and costs or to consider feasibility. Finally, courts are consistently deferential to agency economic analysis when the statute fails to require economic analysis at all.

Rational agencies seeking to avoid judicial reversal could be expected to exhibit a similar pattern. Specific statutory instructions about benefits and costs to consider or the benefit–cost decision rule to follow could be expected to motivate more complete economic analysis and more extensive explanations of how that analysis affected decisions. More general statutory requirements to consider benefits, costs, and economic or technological feasibility may motivate some degree of analysis or explanation that exceeds the norm, but not as much as the more specific requirements could be expected to generate. Finally, statutes that fail to mention economic factors or prohibit the consideration of some economic factors (such as costs) could be expected to have the least extensive economic analysis of all.

This Section tests the following five hypotheses by investigating whether varying statutory provisions related to economic analysis, as well as prior court evaluations of the agency’s economic analysis, are correlated with the quality of regulatory impact analysis or the extent to which the agency claims the analysis was used in its decisions.

Hypothesis 1: The quality and/or claimed use of economic analysis will be greater when the statute requires the agency to consider economic factors.

Hypothesis 2: The quality and/or claimed use of economic analysis will be greater when the statute contains more specific language outlining the economic factors the agency must consider.

Hypothesis 3: The quality and/or claimed use of cost analysis will be lesser if the statute prohibits the agency from considering costs.

Hypothesis 4: The quality and/or claimed use of economic analysis will be lesser if the statute specifies noneconomic factors the agency must consider, such as technological feasibility.

Hypothesis 5: The quality and/or claimed use of economic analysis will be greater if a federal appeals court previously evaluated the agency’s economic analysis of a similar regulation issued under the same statute or a predecessor statute.

The data on the quality and claimed use of regulatory impact analysis comes from the Mercatus Center’s Regulatory Report Card.  The Re-

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220. See Ellig & McLaughlin, supra note 10 (providing a description of the Report Card
port Card project assessed the quality and claimed use of regulatory impact analyses accompanying the 130 economically significant, prescriptive regulations proposed by Executive Branch agencies that cleared OIRA review between 2008 and 2013.

A. Statutory Considerations of Interest

Reviewing the notices of proposed rulemaking (NPRMs) for the 130 regulations in the Report Card dataset, we have identified five types of factors that statutes either require or prohibit the agency from considering. Each type of statutory consideration directs or implies that the agency should conduct specific types of analysis. In addition, each type of statutory consideration involves a different decisionmaking rule for the agency to follow. Table 1 lists the five statutory considerations in order, from the consideration most likely to encourage more thorough regulatory impact analysis and explanation of how it was used, to the consideration least likely to do so.

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projects and assessment data); Ellig, supra note 10 (same).
### Table 1. Statutory Considerations that May Affect the Quality or Use of Economic Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statutory Consideration</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Analysis Required</th>
<th>Decision Rule</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consider enumerated benefits and costs</td>
<td>EPCA—DOE appliance energy efficiency standards</td>
<td>Benefits, costs, and other factors specified in the statute</td>
<td>Regulate if benefits exceed costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CWA OSHA PHMSA CAA—source emission standards FMCSA PREA</td>
<td>Benefits, costs, and other factors identified by the agency</td>
<td>Regulate if the regulation is cost-effective or if benefits bear some other relationship to costs that the agency decides is reasonable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic feasibility (or practicability)</td>
<td>EPCA—CAFE CWA OSHA MSHA</td>
<td>Costs compared to industry revenue; other large changes that might result from costs</td>
<td>Regulate if the regulation’s costs will not create significant adverse effects (e.g., bankruptcy of industry)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost consideration prohibited</td>
<td>CAA—NAAQS</td>
<td>Benefits—health effects</td>
<td>Set standards based solely on health considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological feasibility</td>
<td>EPCA CWA OSHA MSHA PHMSA CAA—source emission standards</td>
<td>Widely available technology</td>
<td>Regulate if technology required for compliance is widely available or will become widely available</td>
</tr>
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221. Table 1 includes agency descriptions of statutory authority in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for each of the 130 regulations, supplemented by consultation of the relevant statute when the description in the NPRM was unclear. The 130 regulations are listed in Ellig, supra note 10. Copies of NPRMs are available at www.mercatus.org/reportcards.
The five types of statutory considerations listed in Table 1 closely mirror the list of five types of statutory considerations discussed in Section II of this Article. Two of the statutory factors listed—“Consider enumerated benefits and costs” and “Consider benefits and costs”—are the same in Table 1 and Section II. Section II discusses economic and technological feasibility together, because all the cases discussed in that Section that involved one of these considerations also involved the other. Table 1 and our subsequent econometric analysis break out economic feasibility and technological feasibility as separate considerations because some of the regulations in our dataset were issued under statutes that require one but not both considerations. Table 1 includes no statutory requirements that the agency choose a specific alternative identified by the analysis because none of the regulations in our sample were issued under statutes with that type of requirement. Table 1 includes one statutory factor not discussed in Section II—“Cost consideration prohibited”—because some of the regulations in our sample were issued under a statute prohibiting cost consideration, but none of the cases discussed in Section II involved a prohibition on cost consideration. The final category considered in Section II—regulations issued under a statute that neither requires nor forbids consideration of benefits and costs—is the control group of regulations in our statistical analysis.

1. Consider Enumerated Benefits and Costs

Under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), the DOE can issue an energy efficiency standard only if it determines that the proposed standard is technologically feasible and economically justified. To identify whether the standard is economically justified, the DOE determines whether the benefits of the standard exceed the burdens by considering seven statutory factors: (1) the economic impact on manufacturers and consumers; (2) consumer operating cost savings compared to any initial cost increase; (3) total projected savings of energy, water, or both; (4) any lessened utility or performance of the product; (5) the impact of any lessening of competition; (6) the need for energy and water conservation; and (7) other factors the secretary of energy considers relevant.222

This list clearly highlights major benefit and cost factors that the DOE’s analysis ought to include. Factors 1, 2, 4, and 5 affect benefits or costs to consumers or manufacturers. Factors 3 and 6, related to resource savings and conservation, could also affect benefits to these parties or to society as a

whole. If the DOE follows the statutory mandate, it should produce significant analysis of benefits and costs.

The EPCA’s requirement is not quite a benefit–cost test because not all of the factors that count as “benefits” and “burdens” under the statute are economic benefits and costs. Factors 3 and 6 could be interpreted to allow decisionmakers to assign a value to resource savings or conservation that differs from the value a well-informed, rational consumer would place on them. Factor 7 allows the DOE to consider issues other than benefits or costs, even in determining whether the regulation is “economically justified.” Thus, the list deviates from a pure benefit–cost test because it allows factors other than economic benefits and costs to affect the determination of whether a regulation is economically justified. (No regulation in our sample was issued under a statute requiring a benefit–cost test as the sole factor determining whether the regulation is adopted or which alternative is adopted.) Nevertheless, the instruction to consider several factors that are significant benefits or costs leads us to expect that the DOE would also explain how they affected decisions about the regulation.

2. Consider Benefits and Costs

A number of statutes require agencies to consider benefits and costs without requiring a specific benefit–cost test. For example, the Clean Water Act (CWA) gives the EPA wide discretion to determine whether the additional costs of additional required effluent reductions are justified by the benefits, unless a proposed reduction is “wholly out of proportion to the costs of achieving such marginal levels of reduction.”223 When the EPA considers adopting emissions standards for sources of hazardous air pollutants that go beyond what the EPA has determined is the Maximum Achievable Control Technology, it must consider costs and customarily assesses the cost-effectiveness of additional control measures.224 Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), a workplace safety standard must be cost-effective.225 The Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) requires the Attorney General to adopt national standards intended to reduce prison rape, but the standards may not impose additional substantial costs

Because these kinds of provisions require agencies to consider benefits and costs, they may motivate agencies to offer a more thorough assessment of costs and a more thorough comparison with benefits. They may also prompt agencies to provide a more careful explanation of how benefits and costs were relevant to regulatory decisions, for two reasons: (1) the agency must demonstrate that it considered benefits and costs, and (2) the agency must explain how it interpreted this requirement and how it compared benefits and costs.

3. Economic Feasibility (or Practicability)

In some cases, an agency must consider whether a regulation is “economically feasible” or “economically practicable.” This kind of standard assesses whether many or most of the regulated entities could comply without serious adverse economic consequences.

For example, OSHA’s definition of economic feasibility means that the “industry can absorb or pass on the costs of compliance without threatening its long-term profitability or competitive structure.”227 Similarly, mine safety standards must be feasible, and the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) considers economic feasibility as part of its feasibility determination. The agency presumes the regulation is economically feasible if the costs are less than one percent of industry revenues.228 Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for automobiles must be within the financial capability of the industry as a whole and cannot lead to adverse economic consequences such as significant job losses or “unreasonable elimination of consumer choice.”229

An economic feasibility requirement could be expected to motivate some additional analysis of compliance costs and assessment of whether the regulated entities can “afford” to comply. It may not produce any significant improvement in discussion of how the agency’s analysis affected decisions, other than a checkoff that the regulation is economically feasible.

227. See Am. Textile, 452 U.S. at 530, n.55.
4. **Cost Consideration Prohibited**

It is rare for an agency to be prohibited from considering costs at all. The only regulations in our sample accompanied by such a prohibition are the five EPA regulations that set National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) under the Clean Air Act (CAA). If an agency is prohibited from considering costs, we would logically expect that it would produce little or no cost analysis, provide a less thorough explanation of how its regulatory impact analysis affected decisions, and provide no explanation of how the net benefits of alternatives affected its decisions. Because the CAA instructs the EPA to set air quality standards solely based on health considerations, it may motivate the agency to produce a more extensive analysis of the benefits of the proposed regulation.

5. **Technological Feasibility**

Some regulations must pass a technological feasibility determination. This may be explicitly labeled a technological feasibility analysis, as when NHTSA determines whether a given technology to improve fuel efficiency will be available for commercial application in a particular model year.230 Or it may be an implicit assessment of technological feasibility, such as the analysis the EPA undertakes when it establishes the Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) floor when regulating emissions from a source of hazardous air pollutants. The MACT floor for new and existing sources is based on emissions reductions actually achieved by the best-performing sources.231 Thus, the floor depends on emissions reductions achieved by a technology that has been placed in practice—an implicit feasibility determination.

In both types of cases, feasibility depends only on the availability of the relevant technology for widespread use, not on the cost of the technology. Thus, we should not expect a technological feasibility requirement to improve the quality or use of economic analysis. Indeed, such a requirement may be associated with less thorough or less thoroughly explained economic analysis, if only because it diverts scarce analytical resources from economic to technological assessments.

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230. Id.

B. Statutory Considerations and Judicial Review

A prior lawsuit involving the economic analysis of a similar regulation could improve the quality or claimed use of analysis by making the agency more sensitive to litigation risk. In addition to identifying whether a regulation was issued subject to any of the statutory considerations listed in Section III.A, we used the thirty-three cases discussed in Section II to identify whether a federal appeals court previously evaluated the agency’s economic analysis of a similar regulation issued under the same statute or a predecessor statute.

As Table 2 shows, federal appeals courts evaluated the agency’s economic analysis in a prior lawsuit for virtually all regulations issued under statutes that require consideration of economic factors or technological feasibility. Thus, our independent variables indicating these statutory factors essentially test for their effect when the agency has also experienced a lawsuit in which an appeals court evaluated the agency’s economic analysis. The five regulations for which the EPA was prohibited from considering costs did not have a prior lawsuit in which an appeals court evaluated the agency’s economic analysis. In addition, for six regulations in our sample, appeals courts evaluated the agency’s economic analysis in a prior lawsuit even though there was no language in the statute specifically requiring consideration of economic or technological factors. For these six regulations, courts evaluated the economic analysis under the arbitrary and capricious standard with no additional statutory guidance.
Table 2. Statutory Considerations and Prior Court Decisions Evaluating Agency Economic Analysis\textsuperscript{232}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statutory Consideration</th>
<th>Number of Regulations</th>
<th>Number of Regulations with Prior Court Decision Evaluating Agency Economic Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consider enumerated benefits and costs</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider benefits and costs</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic feasibility (or practicability)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost consideration prohibited</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological feasibility</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Data Analysis and Results

1. Data on the Quality and Claimed Use of Regulatory Impact Analysis

Each assessment in the Regulatory Report Card project covered the four major elements of regulatory impact analysis: analysis of the problem the regulation sought to solve, development of alternatives to the regulation, estimation of the benefits and costs of the regulation, and the alternatives. Two additional criteria assessed how well the agency explained how it used the analysis in decisions and how well the agency explained the role of net benefits (benefits minus costs) in its decisions. Since the evaluators could not observe the actual decisionmaking process inside the agencies, the two criteria are necessarily assessments of the extent to which the agency claimed to use the analysis.\textsuperscript{233}

\textsuperscript{232} Table 2 is based on the Authors’ calculations. Authors coded each regulation based on the agency’s description of the statutory authority for the regulation in the NPRM. A regulation was coded as having a prior court decision if one of the court decisions listed in the Appendix involved a regulation issued under the same or a predecessor statute.

\textsuperscript{233} One might expect that evaluations on these two criteria would generate a lot of “false positives” because agencies claim to use the analysis in decisions even if they did not. But the data demonstrate that, in the majority of cases, federal agencies do not claim to have used the regulatory impact analysis (RIA) at all. See Ellig, \textit{supra} note 10, at 15–16. “There may well be a countervailing tendency for false negatives because an agency’s RIA can be challenged in court if the agency relies on it to justify decisions about a regulation.” \textit{Id.; see}
Trained evaluators assessed the analysis accompanying each regulation on each of the six criteria using a 0–5 scale, with zero indicating no relevant content and five indicating reasonably complete analysis. Inter-rater reliability tests indicate that the evaluations are consistent across evaluators. These data have been used as indicators of the quality of regulatory impact analysis in multiple prior published articles.

A simple comparison of means suggests that the quality and claimed use of economic analysis often varies systematically based on the five statutory considerations. Table 3 compares the mean scores of the regulations issued under statutes with each of the five considerations of interest with the mean scores for regulations issued under statutes that do not include any of these considerations. The final line of the Table shows the mean scores for the seventy-five regulations issued under statutes that include none of the five considerations and for which there was no prior court decision evaluating the agency’s economic analysis for a similar regulation under the same statute or a predecessor statute.

\[\text{also Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 7, at 591.}\]

\[\text{234. For a complete explanation of the Report Card evaluation methodology, see Ellig & McLaughlin, supra note 10.}\]


### Table 3. Comparison of Means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enumerated benefits and costs (n = 16)</th>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Alternatives</th>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Costs</th>
<th>Explanation of Use</th>
<th>Cognizance of Net Benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.6**</td>
<td>3.9***</td>
<td>3.7***</td>
<td>3.6***</td>
<td>3.9***</td>
<td>4.4***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider benefits and costs (n = 21)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.6***</td>
<td>2.9***</td>
<td>2.4*</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic feasibility (n = 13)</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.6***</td>
<td>3.2***</td>
<td>2.9***</td>
<td>2.8*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost consideration prohibited (n = 5)</td>
<td>3.2**</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.2***</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.8*</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological feasibility (n = 38)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.1***</td>
<td>3.7***</td>
<td>3.3***</td>
<td>3.0***</td>
<td>3.2***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court decision without statutory direction (n = 6)</td>
<td>1.5*</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulations with none of these statutory considerations and no prior court decision evaluating economic analysis (n = 75)</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Statistical significance of difference compared to regulations with none of these statutory considerations: ***>99 percent, **>95 percent, *>90 percent.

The difference is largest and most consistent for the statutory consideration that enumerates the types of benefits and costs the agency must consider, which is associated with more thorough analysis of alternatives, benefits,
and costs, as well as more thorough explanations of how the agency used the analysis in decisions. However, the mean score for analysis of the underlying problem is significantly lower for regulations issued under a statute that enumerates benefits and costs. Analysis of the problem is the one topic this statute does not require.

Less specific requirements that the agency consider benefits and costs, or consider economic or technological feasibility, also appear to be associated with more thorough analysis of benefits and costs and more thorough explanations of how the analysis affected decisions. Statutes requiring consideration of benefits, costs, or economic feasibility, though, are not associated with better analysis of the problem or alternatives. A technological feasibility requirement does appear to be associated with more thorough analysis of alternatives. A prohibition on consideration of costs appears to be associated with more thorough analysis of the problem and benefits, but no difference in the analysis of alternatives and costs. Finally, a prior court decision evaluating an agency’s economic analysis of a similar regulation does not appear to be correlated with the quality or claimed use of analysis.

All of these conclusions must be regarded as tentative because a comparison of means does not control for interrelationships between the statutory factors or other factors that might affect the quality or claimed use of analysis. Some regulations were issued under statutes that include more than one of the five considerations. For example, a number of regulations were issued under statutes that require an assessment of technological feasibility but also require an assessment of economic feasibility or require the agency to consider benefits and costs in some indeterminate way. The positive correlation between a technological feasibility requirement and the quality and claimed use of analysis may actually be due to the other statutory economic considerations that accompany the technological feasibility requirement. Multivariate analysis is necessary to untangle these relationships.

2. Control Variables

This study employs a battery of control variables used in prior research papers that seeks to explain variations in Report Card scores.\textsuperscript{237} Table 4 lists the variables and offers brief explanations.\textsuperscript{238}

Prior research demonstrates that it is also advisable to control for agen-

\textsuperscript{237} See, e.g., Ellig & McLaughlin, supra note 10; Ellig & Conover, supra note 236; Ellig & Fike, supra note 236; Ellig, McLaughlin & Morrall, supra note 235.

\textsuperscript{238} For more extensive explanations and justifications of these variables, see Ellig, supra note 10 and references cited therein.
Agency-specific effects could include the number and qualifications of economists working on regulations, the manner in which the economists are organized and managed, the types of regulations the agency issues, and numerous other unobserved factors that could vary based on the identity of the agency.

The regression equation for the full model is as follows:

\[
\text{Score}_i = \alpha + \beta_k \ast \text{Statutory consideration}_{ki} + \gamma \ast \text{Prior court evaluation without statutory direction}_i + \delta \ast \text{Control}_{ji} + \varepsilon_i, \text{ where}
\]

- \( \text{Score}_i \) = regulation \( i \)'s score for quality or use of analysis;
- \( \text{Statutory consideration}_{ki} \) = a vector of five dummy variables \( (k = 1-5) \) indicating whether regulation \( i \) was issued under a statute that includes any of the five statutory considerations listed in Table 3, 0 otherwise;
- \( \text{Prior court evaluation without statutory direction}_i \) = 1 if, for regulation \( i \), a federal appeals court previously evaluated the agency’s economic analysis of a similar regulation issued under the same statute or a predecessor statute and the regulation was not subject to any of the five statutory considerations (listed in Table 3), 0 otherwise;
- \( \text{Control}_{ji} \) = a vector of \( j \) control variables (listed in Table 4).

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239. See Ellig & Fike, supra note 236.
### Table 4. Control Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>Indicates that OIRA concluded review of the proposed regulation during the Obama Administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential priority</td>
<td>Indicates that the regulation is related to a legacy presidential priority (homeland security for Bush, health care for Obama).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency policy preference</td>
<td>A scale developed by Clinton and Lewis that indicates whether the mission, culture, and policy views of the agency are more “conservative” or “liberal.” The sign of the scores is reversed for the Obama Administration. Thus, the variable tests whether agencies tend to produce better analysis or more thorough explanations of how they used the analysis when the agency’s policy preference is more closely aligned with the administration’s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush midnight regulations</td>
<td>Indicates that the final regulation was issued during the “midnight period” of the Bush Administration between Election Day 2008 and Inauguration Day 2009. Separate variables indicate whether the proposed regulation cleared OIRA review before or after June 1, 2008, to test whether there is a difference for rushed midnight regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush leftover regulations</td>
<td>Indicates that the regulation was proposed but not finalized during the Bush Administration. Separate variables indicate whether the proposed regulation cleared OIRA review before or after June 1, 2008, to test whether there is a difference for rushed leftover regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obama potential midnight regulations</td>
<td>Indicates that the regulation was proposed but not finalized by the Obama Administration prior to Election Day 2012. These regulations thus could have become midnight regulations if the election of 2012 had turned out differently. As with the Bush midnight regulations, separate variables indicate whether the proposed regulation cleared OIRA review before or after June 1, 2012, to test whether there is a difference for rushed midnight regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public comments and public comments squared</td>
<td>Number of public comments submitted in the regulatory proceeding (divided by 10,000 to make the regression coefficients easier to read). Tests whether the political salience of the regulation is correlated with the quality of claimed use of regulatory impact analysis. The squared term controls for the possibility of diminishing marginal returns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petition</td>
<td>Indicates that the regulation was proposed in response to a petition from an interested party.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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240. See Ellig, supra note 10.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statutory deadline</td>
<td>Indicates whether the statute authorizing the regulation included a deadline for promulgation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial deadline</td>
<td>Indicates whether the regulation was issued pursuant to a court-ordered deadline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation required</td>
<td>Indicates whether a statute required the agency to issue the regulation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prescribed form</td>
<td>Indicates whether a statute prescribed the type of regulation to be issued—e.g., a disclosure requirement or an emission standard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prescribed stringency</td>
<td>Indicates whether a statute largely prescribed the stringency of the regulation or whether the statute gave the agency significant authority to make this determination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prescribed coverage</td>
<td>Indicates whether a statute largely prescribed what entities are covered by the regulation or whether the statute gave the agency significant authority to make this determination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acting OIRA administrator</td>
<td>Indicates whether the proposed regulation cleared OIRA review when OIRA was headed by an acting administrator rather than a presidential appointee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects exceed $1 billion</td>
<td>Indicates whether the agency indicated that the benefits, costs, or other economic effects of the regulation exceeded $1 billion annually.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year dummy variables</td>
<td>Indicates the year the proposed regulation cleared OIRA review. There is no dummy for 2009 because the regressions include a dummy for the Obama Administration. Thus, the year variables test whether the quality or claimed use of regulatory impact analysis is different from the first year of the Obama Administration.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. **Econometric Method**

The dependent score variables are ordinal. An analysis of the systemic problem that receives a score of two points, for example, is not necessarily twice as good as an analysis that receives a score of one point. Since the dependent variable is ordinal, the most appropriate econometric method is ordered logit.

We use the “blow up and cluster” (BUC) ordered logit estimator developed by Baetschmann, Staub, and Winkelmann. Fixed effects ordered logit may not be a consistent estimator when the number of observations in each group is small. Baetschmann et al. demonstrate that their BUC estimator is consistent, reasonably efficient, and remains unbiased for small sample sizes. The method receives its name because the sample is “blown up” by creating $K-1$ copies of each observation, where $K$ is the number of possible values the dependent variable could take. Each of the copies is dichotomized at one of the different possible values of the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered by observation, since all of the $K-1$ copies are obviously related to each other. Conditional maximum likelihood is applied to the entire blown-up set of observations.

In the discussion that follows, we focus solely on the statistical significance of the coefficients rather than their magnitude. Coefficients in an ordered logit regression do not have the same straightforward quantitative interpretation as coefficients in an ordinary least squares regression. The dependent variable in an ordered logit regression equation is the log of the ratio of the odds that the score will or will not have a designated value. The coefficients in an ordered logit regression estimate how each explanatory variable affects this odds ratio. To estimate a quantitative effect, one must use the results of the regression to simulate how a change in the variable of interest affects the odds of the dependent variable having a specific value. The BUC method does not produce output that can be used for this purpose.

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243. This is why the econometric results reported in the Tables below have several hundred observations even though there are only 130 regulations.

4. Econometric Results

Table 5 shows econometric results for the statutory considerations of interest, controlling for agency-specific fixed effects. The Table also includes the dummy variable *Prior court evaluation without statutory direction*. The “bivariate” results are for regressions that include each variable by itself plus agency fixed effects. The “multivariate” results are for regressions that include all six variables plus agency fixed effects. Table 6 includes the additional control variables listed in Table 4. Since the results are similar, we discuss each variable’s results from both Tables simultaneously.
### Table 5. Statutory Considerations with Agency Fixed Effects Only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Alternatives</th>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Costs</th>
<th>Explanation of Use</th>
<th>Cognizance of Net Benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enumerated benefits and costs</td>
<td>$-1.21^{**}$</td>
<td>N.C.</td>
<td>N.C.</td>
<td>N.C.</td>
<td>38.54^{**}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider benefits and costs</td>
<td>$-0.26$</td>
<td>$-0.54$</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.44^{**}</td>
<td>0.67^{**}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic feasibility</td>
<td>$-0.24$</td>
<td>$-0.67^{**}$</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>1.51^{**}</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost consideration prohibited</td>
<td>$2.50^{**}$</td>
<td>$0.71^{**}$</td>
<td>1.88^{**}</td>
<td>$-1.48^{**}$</td>
<td>$-2.05^{**}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological feasibility</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>$-0.64$</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>1.09^{**}</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior court evaluation without statutory direction</td>
<td>$-2.60^{**}$</td>
<td>$1.13^{**}$</td>
<td>0.78^{**}</td>
<td>0.07^{**}</td>
<td>$-0.02^{**}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 10% level.
### Multivariate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>934</th>
<th>18.05***</th>
<th>13.77***</th>
<th>15.98***</th>
<th>18.84***</th>
<th>18.90***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enumerated benefits and costs</td>
<td>-2.46***</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider benefits and costs</td>
<td>-0.64</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1.18**</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic feasibility</td>
<td>-1.01**</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>1.47*</td>
<td>2.23*</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost consideration prohibited</td>
<td>2.64***</td>
<td>0.33*</td>
<td>2.66***</td>
<td>-1.30***</td>
<td>-2.03***</td>
<td>-0.60***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological feasibility</td>
<td>1.26*</td>
<td>-1.57***</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-2.02*</td>
<td>-1.38***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior court evaluation without statutory direction</td>
<td>-2.60***</td>
<td>0.96***</td>
<td>1.25***</td>
<td>0.21**</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** P-values are in parentheses. Statistical significance: ***>99 percent, **>95 percent, *>90 percent. N.C. = No result because the regression did not converge.
Table 6. Statutory Considerations with Agency Fixed Effects and Additional Control Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Alternatives</th>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Costs</th>
<th>Explanation of Use</th>
<th>Cognizance of Net Benefits</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>12.99***</td>
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<td>22.23***</td>
</tr>
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<td>3.07***</td>
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<td>-3.83***</td>
</tr>
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<td>-1.21***</td>
<td>-2.76</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush pre–June 1 midnight regulation</td>
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<td>-3.67***</td>
<td>-1.70**</td>
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<td>-2.84***</td>
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<td>Obama pre–June 1 potential midnight regulation</td>
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</tr>
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<td>(0.56)</td>
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<td>(0.99)</td>
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<td>(0.41)</td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.32</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>1.73**</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.47)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.73)</td>
<td>(0.84)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Judicial deadline</td>
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<td>0.34*</td>
<td>1.04*</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>-1.05</td>
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<td>(0.23)</td>
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<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
<td>-1.05*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.90)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
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</table>
Consider Enumerated Benefits and Costs. This variable is positively correlated with three of the four criteria measuring the quality of regulatory impact analysis and with both criteria explaining how the analysis affected decisions. The correlations are highly statistically significant. These results suggest that the clear and specific statutory directions in the EPCA have motivated the DOE to devote extensive effort to estimation of benefits and costs, explanation of how these calculations affected decisions, and explanation of how the net benefits of alternatives affected decisions.
This inference is further bolstered by the results for analysis of the systemic problem. The score for this criterion is lower in Table 5, and this difference is highly statistically significant. The score is also lower in Table 6, but the difference is not statistically significant. The EPCA does not require the DOE to provide an evidence-based demonstration of the existence and cause of the problem the regulation seeks to solve. Indeed, the DOE has been criticized by other scholars for failing to demonstrate the existence of a market failure that would motivate the regulations. Instead, the analysis for energy efficiency regulations routinely assumes that consumers and business firms irrationally discount the value of future energy savings.245 Thus, the DOE’s analysis is no better, and possibly worse, for the one criterion for which the EPCA requires no economic analysis.246

Consider Benefits and Costs. Both tables reveal that when agencies are directed to consider benefits and costs, they provide more thorough explanations of how the regulatory impact analysis affected decisions. Table 6 shows that, after controlling for other factors, a regulation issued under a statute requiring the agency to consider benefits and costs is also accompanied by a more thorough analysis of alternatives. This suggests that, when faced with a requirement to consider benefits and costs, the agency makes some additional effort to compare benefits and costs of alternatives, not just the benefits and costs of the proposed regulation. The last column of Table 6 also indicates that, when required to consider benefits and costs, the agency provides a more thorough explanation of how net benefits affected its decisions.

The contrast of these results with the results for Enumerated benefits and costs is informative. A general requirement to consider benefits and costs is associated with better explanations of how the agency used the analysis, and possibly with better analysis of alternatives, whereas the more specific enum-


246. There are seventeen DOE regulations in the sample; sixteen of them are energy efficiency regulations subject to the statutory requirement that DOE consider a detailed list of benefits and costs. The inclusion of department-specific fixed effects raises the possibility that the large coefficients and high statistical significance of Enumerated benefits and costs are driven by the comparison of the sixteen energy efficiency regulations with the sole other regulation. When we run the regressions in Table 6 using ordered logit without fixed effects, Enumerated benefits and costs is still highly statistically significant in all regressions except the one for costs, where it is significant at the ninety percent level. Thus, we are confident that the strong results for this variable are not driven simply by the comparison with one other DOE regulation induced by the fixed-effects specification.
meration of benefits and costs is associated with better analysis and explanations across the board (with the exception of analysis of the problem).

**Economic Feasibility.** Economic feasibility is primarily a cost issue, and an economic feasibility requirement is indeed positively correlated with the regulation’s score for analysis of costs. Both Tables 5 and 6 show that an economic feasibility requirement is negatively correlated with analysis of the problem the regulation seeks to solve. This result is not surprising, since demonstrating that a regulation is economically feasible has no necessary relationship to demonstrating that a problem exists or that the regulation solves the problem.

**Cost Consideration Prohibited.** The results in both tables indicate that the CAA’s prohibition on consideration of costs when setting air quality standards is associated with less thorough analysis of costs. For these regulations, the EPA also provides less thorough explanations of how the analysis affected decisions and how net benefits affected decisions. On the other hand, the EPA also provides a more thorough analysis of the underlying problem and the benefits of the regulation. Apparently, the EPA allocates its analytical effort based on the requirement that it set air quality standards on the basis of health effects and avoid consideration of costs.

**Technological Feasibility.** A technological feasibility requirement is associated with less thorough analysis of alternatives and less thorough explanation of how the net benefits of alternatives affected regulatory decisions. Table 6 also indicates that regulations subject to a technological feasibility requirement are accompanied by less thorough analysis of costs. This is precisely what one would expect when the agency is following a directive to assess technological, rather than economic, possibilities.

**Prior Court Decision without Statutory Direction.** Results for this variable indicate that a prior court decision under a statute that neither required nor prohibited economic considerations is associated with better analysis of alternatives, benefits, and costs. However, this type of prior court decision also appears to be associated with less thorough analysis of the problem the regulation seeks to solve. After controlling for the other economic consideration variables in Table 5 and for the full set of control variables in Table 6, this kind of prior court decision does not seem to be associated with more thorough explanations of how the agency claimed to use the analysis.

**Separate Effect of Prior Court Decisions.** The results above suggest that court evaluations of agencies’ economic analyses are associated with better analysis, even in the absence of specific statutory language requiring the agency to consider economic factors. We can gain additional insight into the interplay between statutory language and judicial review by employing a dummy variable equal to one when a federal appeals court previously evaluated the agency’s economic analysis of a similar regulation issued under
the same statute or a predecessor statute. Ideally, this dummy variable will identify the effect of judicial review, and the statutory consideration variables will then identify the effect of statutory language.

Table 7 shows regression results when using two different versions of this variable. In Model 1, Prior court evaluation equals one when a federal appeals court previously evaluated the agency’s economic analysis of a similar regulation issued under the same statute or a predecessor statute. In Model 2, Prior detailed court evaluation equals one when we determined that a federal appeals court previously engaged in a detailed evaluation of the agency’s economic analysis of a similar regulation issued under the same statute or a predecessor statute. Both sets of regressions employ the full model using all the other control variables in Table 6, but coefficients on the control variables are omitted from Table 7 to conserve space.

247. Our criteria for making this determination are discussed in Section II and in the Appendix.
Table 7. Separating Effects of Statutory Language and Judicial Review

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Alternatives</th>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Costs</th>
<th>Explanation of Use</th>
<th>Cognizance of Net Benefits</th>
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</thead>
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<td><strong>Model 1</strong></td>
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<td>11.99***</td>
<td>18.78***</td>
<td>21.83***</td>
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<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
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<td>2.60*</td>
<td>1.28</td>
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<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.78)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.85)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.44</td>
<td>3.53***</td>
<td>−2.50**</td>
<td>−3.70***</td>
<td>−0.92</td>
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<td>(0.14)</td>
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<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
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<td>1.33**</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>1.44**</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.72)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
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<td>363</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
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<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.41</td>
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### Model 2

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<th>Standard Error</th>
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<th>Standard Error</th>
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<th>Standard Error</th>
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<td>17.69***</td>
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<td>10.26***</td>
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<td>15.70***</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>20.96***</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.15</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>1.26**</td>
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<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>3.01***</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-2.89***</td>
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<td>-3.80***</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<td>-0.73**</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-2.70*</td>
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<td>Prior detailed court evaluation</td>
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<td>0.50</td>
<td>4.53***</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.92***</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.95***</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
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<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
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<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.35</td>
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</table>

**NOTE:** *P*-values are in parentheses. Statistical significance: ***>99 percent, ***>95 percent, *>90 percent. Regressions control for agency fixed effects and all control variables listed in Table 7; coefficients for control variables are omitted to conserve space.

For the five statutory consideration variables, both models in Table 7 produce results similar to those in Table 6. The main difference in Table 7 is that *Consider benefits and costs* is only statistically significant at the ninety percent level for two regressions under Model 1.248 These results clearly...

248. This may have occurred due to significant collinearity between *Consider benefits and*...
show that statutory considerations are often correlated with the quality and claimed use of economic analysis even after controlling for previous cases in which courts reviewed agency economic analysis. The two court evaluation variables also indicate that judicial review is correlated with the quality and claimed use of economic analysis, even after controlling for statutory language directing or prohibiting the agency from considering economic factors.

IV. CONCLUSION

Statutory language and judicial review of agency economic analysis both make a difference. Our case law and econometric analyses found that stricter and more detailed statutory standards are correlated with more careful scrutiny by the courts and higher-quality analysis by the agencies. The econometric results also show that agencies produce more thorough analysis and more thorough explanations of how net benefits affected their decisions when a federal appeals court had previously evaluated the agency’s economic analysis for a similar regulation issued under the same statute or a predecessor statute.

These findings are consistent with our thesis that more thorough review by the courts creates a strong incentive for agencies to conduct better economic analyses. Indeed, our earlier paper highlighted a handful of instances in which an agency improved its analysis in a specific rule in response to a judicial remand. Nevertheless, correlation need not imply causation. The results are also consistent with the theory that courts and agencies independently respond to stricter statutory language by enhancing the quality of their analysis. For purposes of public policy, the precise causal link may not be relevant. It is clear that stricter and more detailed statutory standards are associated with more thorough analysis by courts and agencies alike.

In one sense, this result is not terribly surprising: courts and agencies seem to be responding properly to congressional directives. But when scrutinized more closely, our results suggest that this is only true on the far ends of the spectrum. More detailed statutory standards are associated with more thorough analysis by both courts and agencies, and statutory silence is associated with less detailed analysis by agencies and highly deferential re-

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249. Bull & Ellig, supra note 2, at 776–84.
view by courts. The results in the middle ranges, however, are troubling. Though agencies are perhaps responding as Congress intended, conducting an intermediate level of analysis when the statute requires them to consider benefits and costs or to assess economic feasibility, the thoroughness of judicial review is much less predictable.

Specifically, each of the various benefit–cost consideration standards and the economic feasibility standard led to a wide array of outcomes on judicial review. Some courts rigorously examine not only the agency’s analysis of regulatory costs and benefits but also the thoroughness with which the agency addressed other topics associated with a high-quality regulatory impact analysis, such as identifying a regulatory baseline and assessing a full range of alternative approaches. Other courts more or less defer completely to the agency, merely ensuring that the agency checked the appropriate boxes by citing some evidence regarding benefits or costs but not independently assessing the quality of the evidence or the cogency of the agency’s conclusions. And still other courts apply an intermediate level of analysis. This creates significant uncertainty for agency officials and regulated entities alike, as neither can reliably predict how thoroughly a reviewing court will assess an agency’s economic analysis simply by looking to the statutory standard. It also almost certainly undermines congressional intent: regardless of whether members of Congress desired strict or lax judicial review, they presumably intended the courts to apply consistent standards from case to case.

To make matters worse, the vaguer statutory economic analysis standards appear to predominate. Of the thirty-three cases we analyzed, twenty-three involved an underlying statute that required the agency merely to “consider” regulatory costs, benefits, or both, or to assess the economic feasibility of the rule. About one-third of the regulations in the dataset for the econometric analysis were issued under statutes requiring the agency to consider costs, benefits, or both, or to assess the economic feasibility of the rule. Given that agencies issue a significant number of rules under those statutory regimes, and rules issued under those regimes tend to produce a large number of cases on judicial review, it is safe to assume that both agency officials and regulated parties encounter significant uncertainty in many cases.

The scope of uncertainty could well grow in coming years. In the past, statutes that neglected to mention benefits or costs appeared to give the agency a high degree of discretion in considering or ignoring a rule’s economic effects. However, *Michigan v. EPA* and similar cases have likely shifted that dynamic, creating a presumptive benefit–cost consideration re-
requirement in the absence of a statutory prohibition on cost consideration.\textsuperscript{250}

Congress has traditionally been very reluctant to grasp the nettle and provide regulatory agencies with detailed guidance on the quality and use of economic analysis.\textsuperscript{251} Indeed, ambiguity and wide grants of discretion to agencies have often been part of the political compromises that secured passage of regulatory reform legislation in the past.\textsuperscript{252} The last few sessions, however, have witnessed numerous calls for Congress to recapture some of the policymaking powers it has ceded to agencies,\textsuperscript{253} and several bills would provide greater guidance to agencies as they assess the effects of their rules.\textsuperscript{254} If Congress seeks to clarify the role of benefits and costs in regulatory decisionmaking, a statutory benefit–cost “consideration” requirement or an economic feasibility requirement may at first glance appear to be a workable compromise between proponents and opponents of robust economic analysis in agency rulemaking. Our findings suggest, however, that both sides will likely be disappointed by this compromise in the long term.

In some instances, courts will apply a version of “hard look” review that is likely highly undesirable to opponents of economic analysis, and in others, courts will exhibit a level of deference to agency decisionmaking that proponents of economic analysis are likely to consider excessive. In addition,

\textsuperscript{250} See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{251} See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Delegation Really Running Riot, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1035, 1041 (2007) (“Some scholars claim that under the Constitution, early Congresses enacted all manner of broad conventional delegations. One might argue that ever since then, Congress has repeatedly resorted to broad delegations of lawmaking authority as a means of effectuating congressional powers and purposes.”); see also Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Becomes Domination: Due Process of Administrative Lawmaking, 46 Ga. L. Rev. 117, 120 (2011); Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2097, 2131 (2004).


\textsuperscript{253} See, e.g., Michelle Cottle, Mike Lee’s New Crusade, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/mike-lee-article-one-project/462564 (describing Senator Mike Lee’s Article I project, an initiative designed to “reclaim [Congress’s] status as ‘the first branch’”); see also Christopher J. Walker, Modernizing the Administrative Procedure Act, 69 Admin. L. Rev. 629, 648 (2017) (“Since the new Congress arrived in January, we have seen a wide range of legislation introduced to reform the administrative state. Legislation in both the House and the Senate has been introduced to limit the use of settlements to force agency regulatory activities, to better facilitate congressional review of midnight rules, and to codify the Trump Administration’s one-in, two-out executive order.”).

\textsuperscript{254} See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
the resulting uncertainty will complicate matters for both agencies and regulatory stakeholders.

We do not take any position in this paper on which statutory economic analysis standard, if any, Congress should adopt, or whether it would be better for Congress to announce a cross-cutting standard or tailor the standard to individual cases. But we do encourage Congress to take note of our findings when deciding how to craft such a standard. If Congress seeks to impose a robust economic analysis requirement that will be carefully reviewed by the courts, it can best accomplish this goal by directing the agency to select a certain regulatory alternative, providing a list of economic benefits and costs the agency must consider, or both. If Congress does not want economic analysis to play a significant (and perhaps dominant) role in agency decisionmaking, then it should articulate precisely what consideration (if any) the agency should give to economic factors.

255. This is not inconsistent with the recommendation of our earlier paper, wherein we urge Congress to amend the APA to enumerate the elements of a regulatory impact analysis and to direct courts to ensure that agencies are relying on the best available evidence when conducting judicial review of such analyses. See generally Bull & Ellig, supra note 2. In that paper, we took no position on whether Congress should impose a cross-cutting economic analysis requirement. Instead, we focused solely on how judicial review should be conducted in those instances in which an agency elects or is directed to prepare a regulatory impact analysis, whether by statute, executive order, or an implicit requirement of the APA.
The following chart lists each of the cases analyzed in Section II, providing the case name and citation, a summary of the statute that directed the agency to consider the economic effects of the rule, and an overview of the level of analysis applied by the reviewing court. The cases are ordered based on the prescriptiveness of the statutory standard, with stricter standards listed first.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Name</th>
<th>Statute and Type of Benefit–Cost Analysis Mandate (if any)</th>
<th>Rigor of Analysis</th>
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</table>
| **Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA**, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991) | Least Restrictive Alternative Analysis  
— TSCA [15 U.S.C. § 2605(a)]  
— Agency must adopt least restrictive alternative.  
— Rule is analyzed under “substantial evidence” standard (15 U.S.C. § 2618(c)(1)(B)(i)). | Detailed (reversal)  
Court faults agency for only considering the extreme alternatives (no regulation and outright ban); also points to various flaws in the agency’s analysis (e.g., discounting costs but not benefits, treating unquantified benefits as trump cards, failing to consider risks of substitutes, and tolerating a very high value of statistical life).  
Court closely parses the analysis in light of statutory requirements (including “least burdensome” alternative, “substitutes,” and “unreasonable risk”). |
| **Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck**, 751 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1985) | Maximum Feasible Cost Reduction  
— Statute mandates that the agency seek the “maximum feasible reduction of costs to the public and to the consumer.”  
— Statute also makes specific costs relevant to the analysis (e.g., insurance costs, legal fees). | Detailed (affirmance)  
The court notes that the agency considered a wide range of costs and actually delves into the calculations, considering and rejecting various quibbles with the agency’s methodology (also finds a few flaws but notes that they are harmless). |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Detailed Enumeration of Economic Benefits and Costs</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Summary</th>
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- SEC must consider “efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”                                       | Detailed (reversal) | Court identifies flaws in competition, efficiency, and capital formation analyses, closely analyzing the quality of the agency’s factfinding on each element. |
- SEC must consider efficiency, competition, and capital formation in determining public interest; must consider if impingement of competition is necessary. | Detailed (reversal) | Court points to numerous flaws in benefit–cost analysis (though does not focus so closely on competition, efficiency, or capital formation analysis as *American Equity*). |
- SEC must consider efficiency, competition, and capital formation in deciding what is in the public interest. | Intermediate (reversal) | Court is somewhat forgiving (e.g., permits adopting rule as a prophylactic even in the absence of evidence of existing problem), but it fairly closely parses the agency’s evidence, striking down the rule since the agency ignored an alternative raised by two dissenting commissioners; court also states that the agency cannot simply point to “uncertainty” as a justification for failure to quantify costs—must try to give a range if possible. |
- Statute directs agency to consider benefits and costs as well as related factors such as “efficiency” and “competitiveness.” | Minimal (affirmance) | Court rather summarily rejects various challenges to the agency’s analysis, noting that the agency considered the required statutory factors; the court also explicitly blesses the agency’s consideration of unquantified benefits. |
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Background/Relevant Statute</th>
<th>Analysis</th>
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</table>
|                                                                      | EPCA [42 U.S.C. §§ 325(c), (d), (i)] | Statute sets forth specific economic benefits and costs agency must examine, including economic impact on product manufacturers and consumers, savings in operating costs over the life of covered products, projected energy savings, reduction of utility of covered products, and any reduction in market competition.
|                                                                      |                                                                 | “Substantial evidence” standard of review |
|                                                                      |                                                                 | Court engages in an incredibly rigorous, drawn-out analysis of the technological feasibility and economic justifiability of the standard adopted for eight different appliances.
<p>|                                                                      |                                                                 | Court examines the assumptions underlying the agency’s models, concluding that several assumptions were unjustified and that the agency overgeneralized; the court also finds that the agency failed to explain certain decisions (e.g., using a 10% discount rate); at the same time, the court defers to various findings of the agency, asserting that various minor errors were harmless. |
| Quivira Mining Co. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 866 F.2d 1246 (10th Cir. 1989) | Benefit/Cost Rationalization | Partly relying on the legislative history, the court interprets this language as imposing a “benefit–cost rationalization” standard, which requires that costs bear a “reasonable relationship” to the benefits. |
|                                                                      | 42 U.S.C. § 2114(a) | Court goes into a fairly detailed discussion of the types of benefits and costs the NRC considered, finding the analysis comprehensive and appropriate; the court excused the agency’s overlooking certain costs as harmless error. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Reasonable Relationship between Benefits and Costs</th>
<th>Minimal (affirmance)</th>
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| Am. Mining Congress v. Thomas (American Mining I), 772 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1985) | - 42 U.S.C. § 2022(a)  
- Agency must consider costs and determine whether they bear a reasonable relationship to the benefits. | Court requires simply that EPA consider benefits and costs (which it did) and that it give some explanation for why the balance between the two is reasonable (which it also did)—court must defer to actual balance struck by the agency. |
| Am. Mining Congress v. Thomas (American Mining II), 772 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1985) (companion case to preceding entry) | - 42 U.S.C. § 2022(a)  
- Agency must consider costs and determine whether they bear a reasonable relationship to the benefits. | Minimal (affirmance)  
Court summarily dismisses claim that costs are too high, simply noting that Congress did not require mathematical balancing between costs and benefits. |
| Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1989) | - Clean Water Act [33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)]  
- There are essentially three different levels of regulatory stringency, each of which requires consideration of costs and some of which require consideration of the relationship between benefits and costs. | Intermediate (affirmance)  
The overall analysis is very thorough, but the actual rigor of analysis of benefits and costs is fairly forgiving—for most points, the court simply describes what the agency did and rather summarily affirms that it was reasonable.  
In so doing, the court repeatedly notes that the statute merely requires the agency to take costs into account, which it clearly did. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Reasonable Relationship between Benefits and Costs</th>
<th>Intermediate (affirmance)</th>
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</table>
— There are essentially three different levels of regulatory stringency, each of which requires consideration of costs and some of which require consideration of the relationship between benefits and costs. | Court rejects various challenges to agency’s economic analysis (e.g., a suggestion that agency must consider each firm’s costs rather than the overall costs to the industry), going through the agency’s analysis in some detail to show why it was reasonable.  
In those areas in which the EPA need only consider costs (rather than the relationship between benefits and costs), the court explicitly noted that it was applying this weaker standard (demonstrating that the precise wording of the statute does matter). |
| *Reynolds Metals Co. v. EPA*, 760 F.2d 549 (4th Cir. 1985) | — Clean Water Act [33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)]  
— There are essentially three different levels of regulatory stringency, each of which requires consideration of costs and some of which require consideration of the relationship between benefits and costs. | Minimal (affirmance)  
Court largely defers to the agency, notwithstanding fairly compelling evidence that the agency’s analysis was flawed (e.g., challenger submitted evidence indicating that actual costs were 350 times higher than agency’s estimate); court overlooks certain errors that are deemed harmless, noting that agency’s analysis on other issues was reasonably thorough. |
| Consider Benefits and Costs |
| —ISTEA § 4007—Plain language seems to require benefit–cost analysis only if agency decides not to proceed (agency did perform analysis even though it did proceed); does not say anything about the required relationship between benefits and costs |
| Minimal (reversal) |
| Court does not question benefit or cost estimates; it strikes down rule because agency engaged in illogical course of action (i.e., designed rule correcting a different problem than the one it identified in regulatory analysis). |

<p>| <strong>Gas Appliance Mfrs. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Energy, 998 F.2d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1993)</strong> |
| Consider Benefits and Costs |
| —Agency directed to achieve the “maximum practicable improvement in energy efficiency.” |
| —Agency must analyze economic costs and benefits, among other factors. |
| Detailed (reversal) |
| Court indicates that the “economic costs and benefits” term is the only one that is susceptible to detailed analysis by the courts; it suggests that the agency must shoulder a heavy burden to justify a rule that performs unfavorably on a benefit–cost analysis. |
| Court engages in a rigorous analysis of the agency’s rule, concluding that the agency has not shown that its standard is attainable at a reasonable cost; among other things, the agency failed to produce any prototype (thereby rendering it impossible to determine if standard is practicably attainable at reasonable cost) and did not respond to legitimate objections about the translatability of residential figures to the commercial market. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Consider Benefits and Costs</th>
<th>Analysis Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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</table>
— Agency must consider benefits and costs, among several other factors. | Detailed/Indirect (reversal) | Court engages in a very extensive analysis of the underlying data, focusing especially on flaws in the technical factfinding; the analysis of benefits and costs is fairly indirect. |
— Relevant statutory provision is 49 U.S.C. § 3102(d) (since repealed)  
— Agency must consider benefits and costs, among several other factors. | Detailed/Indirect (reversal) | Court strikes down rule because the agency failed to consider a statutorily mandated factor: effect of rule on drivers.  
The rest of the case is dicta, but the court points to various flaws in the agency’s analysis: assuming that time a driver spends resting is as tiring as time spent driving; failing to weigh benefits and costs of monitoring devices, etc. |
— Relevant statutory provision is 49 U.S.C. § 3102(d) (since repealed)  
— Agency must consider benefits and costs, among several other factors. | Minimal (affirmance) | Court largely defers to the agency—it notes that the agency overlooked certain costs but indicates that this error does not rise to the level of reversal, given the high degree of discretion the agency enjoys. |
—Agency must consider benefits and costs, among several other factors. | Minimal (affirmance)  
Court summarily rejects various challenges to agency’s rule, including contentions that agency changed its position (which court notes agency is free to do, based on new evidence), that agency improperly relied on benefit maximization standard, and that agency committed various errors in its benefit–cost analysis.  
Court states that benefit–cost analysis is reviewed very deferentially and that it must “unquestionably defer” to agency’s expertise in weighing scientific studies. |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **New York v. Reilly, 969 F.2d 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1992)** | Consider Costs  
—42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1)  
—Section 111 of Clean Air Act directs agency to adopt “best” system of emission reduction that has been “adequately demonstrated” while “taking into account the cost.” | Intermediate (reversal)  
Court explicitly states that it will defer to the agency’s findings on the issue of cost (as long as the agency actually considered it), since the statute does not indicate the weight that factor is to be accorded.  
Court strikes down agency’s decision not to regulate lead-acid battery burning, as the agency considered only the extreme alternatives of no regulation and a complete ban. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Consider Costs</th>
<th>Reasonableness/Practicability</th>
<th>Analysis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Fla. Manufactured Hous. Ass’n, Inc. v. Cisneros</em>, 53 F.3d 1565 (11th Cir. 1995)</td>
<td>42 U.S.C. § 5403[f] — Statute directs agency to consider costs, among other factors.</td>
<td>49 U.S.C. § 30111(b) — Statute does not refer to benefits or costs but requires agency to set “reasonable” and “practicable” standards.</td>
<td>The court rather summarily rejects various challenges to the agency’s cost calculations, including the assertion that the agency overlooked various costs (responding that agency did consider such costs and that the court must defer to the agency’s conclusions). Part of the agency’s analysis was contained in a regulatory impact analysis (RIA) prepared under EO 12866; the court declines to consider whether that analysis was directly reviewable, simply noting that there is no reversible error in the agency’s analysis.</td>
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<td><em>Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Mineta</em>, 340 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Detailed (reversal) Discussion of benefits and costs is fairly vague, but the court faults the agency for summarily selecting the lowest-cost alternative without explaining why it was the optimal option (in the face of a benefit–cost analysis that showed that a more rigorous standard had higher net benefits).</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Nat’l Truck Equip. Ass’n v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin.</em>, 711 F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2013)</td>
<td>49 U.S.C. § 30111(a)–(b) — Statute requires that the standard adopted be “reasonable” and “practicable”; a court decision cited in the case indicates that the “reasonable” term requires consideration of costs.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Minimal (affirmance) Court summarily affirms the rule, noting that agency presented compelling evidence of a problem and that it made certain accommodations requested by manufacturers. Court suggests that an RIA prepared under EO 12866 is not reviewable, but it indicates that the agency’s rule was justified in light of the RIA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Case</td>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>Court's Ruling</td>
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<td><em>La. ex rel. Guste v. Verity</em>, 853 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1988)</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>— Endangered Species Act [16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2)] — The quoted provision imposes a net benefit standard, but it is unclear whether that provision is actually being applied here.</td>
<td>Minimal/Indirect (affirmance)</td>
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Court notes that Congress declared that benefits of wildlife preservation were “incalculable” and therefore defers to the agency’s decision to regulate notwithstanding evidence of significant costs (though it indicates costs might be a relevant consideration under another fact pattern). 

Court faults agency for ignoring a major aspect of the problem: higher fuel economy standard may cause manufacturers to produce smaller, less safe cars (risk-risk tradeoff)—agency failed to address this aspect of costs. 

Court defers to the agency’s conclusion that raising fuel economy standards will not cause manufacturers to produce smaller cars, thereby reducing safety—agency cited various statements by manufacturers indicating that this was unlikely to occur.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Technological and Economic Feasibility Analysis</th>
<th>Regulatory Impact Analysis</th>
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</table>
  - When modifying statutory 27.5 mpg standard up or down, agency must set new standard at “maximum feasible average fuel economy level.”  
  - Regulation must be “technologically feasible” and “economically practicable.” | Minimal (affirmance) Court defers to agency’s decision to maintain a relatively high mpg requirement: agency was entitled to consider factors other than the effect of fuel economy on car size (and safety of smaller cars), and agency responded to challenger’s evidence that increased fuel economy requirements would reduce safety. |
| Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008) | - CAFE (Title V of EPCA) [49 U.S.C. § 32902(a), (f)]  
  - Agency must consider “technological feasibility” and “economic practicability.” | Detailed (reversal) Court begins with Chevron analysis, noting that agency can weigh technological feasibility against economic practicability; this standard permits but does not mandate net benefit maximization.  
  Court finds various flaws in the agency’s economic analysis—among other things, the agency ignored the benefits of carbon reduction (uncertainty is not a reason to ignore something entirely). |
  - Must set drinking water contaminant limit at highest level that is technologically and economically feasible. | Indirect (reversal) Court did not focus too closely on economic analysis; rather, it faulted the agency for only analyzing population risk when the rule purported to address both population and individual risk. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Bifurcated Feasibility Analysis</th>
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<tr>
<td><em>Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Tyson</em>, 796 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1986)</td>
<td>“significance” threshold, followed by “reasonableness” analysis</td>
<td>Fairly detailed analysis of “significance” of risk, though court defers to agency’s reliance on flawed studies.</td>
<td>Court rather summarily affirms that a video showing risk of clothes catching fire counted as “substantial evidence” of a “significant” risk; the court’s analysis of the “reasonableness” of the regulation is also fairly pro forma, simply noting that challengers had not shown that the regulation will impose any costs (as workers may already wear flame-resistant clothing).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ala. Power Co. v. Occupational Safety &amp; Health Admin.</em>, 89 F.3d 740 (11th Cir. 1996)</td>
<td>“significance” threshold, followed by “reasonableness” analysis</td>
<td>Court upholds most of rule but finds fault with agency’s failure to set a short-term exposure limit (agency assumed a long-term limit alone was adequate).</td>
<td>Court discusses agency’s benefit–cost analysis (which it was apparently not required to do), deferring to the agency’s efforts to quantify highly uncertain costs and to try to minimize costs where possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Charter Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC</em>, 460 F.3d 31 (D.C. Cir. 2006)</td>
<td>No Mention of Benefits or Costs</td>
<td>Fairly detailed analysis of “significance” of risk, though court defers to agency’s reliance on flawed studies.</td>
<td>Court rather summarily affirms that a video showing risk of clothes catching fire counted as “substantial evidence” of a “significant” risk; the court’s analysis of the “reasonableness” of the regulation is also fairly pro forma, simply noting that challengers had not shown that the regulation will impose any costs (as workers may already wear flame-resistant clothing).</td>
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</table>
No Mention of Benefits or Costs
— All Channel Receiver Act [47 U.S.C. § 303(s)]
— Statute says nothing of benefits or costs.

Minimal (affirmance)
Court is highly deferential, suggesting the agency’s evidence that the cost of digital tuners would decline was adequate and that the agency properly concluded that the benefits justified the costs.

The case suggests that if an agency cites evidence of benefits and costs (whether or not it is required to do so), the court will consider this evidence.