WHAT CONGRESS’S REPEAL EFFORTS CAN TEACH US ABOUT REGULATORY REFORM

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ABSTRACT

Major legislative actions during the early part of the 115th Congress have undermined the central argument for regulatory reform measures such as the REINS Act, a bill that would require congressional approval of all new major regulations. Proponents of the REINS Act argue that it would make the federal regulatory system more democratic by shifting responsibility for regulatory decisions away from unelected bureaucrats and toward the people’s representatives in Congress. But separate legislative actions in the opening of the 115th Congress only call this argument into question. Congress’s most significant initiatives during this period—its derailed attempts to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act and its successful efforts to repeal fifteen regulations under the Congressional Review Act—exhibited a startling lack of democratic deliberation. These repeal efforts reveal how the REINS Act would counterintuitively undermine key democratic elements of the current regulatory process by rendering it less transparent and deliberative.

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INTRODUCTION

“Insane.”1 “Secret.”2 “Not a responsible way to legislate.”3 These are just some of the ways that Republicans in Congress have described their own party’s efforts in 2017 to repeal the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Not only did Republicans ultimately stumble in repealing and replacing the Act, but the legislative process they followed undermined, however unintentionally, the rationale for another one of their legislative priorities: regulatory reform.

One of the most prominent regulatory reform bills advanced by Republicans—the Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act—would dramatically increase congressional involvement in the rule-making process by requiring Congress to approve all major agency rules before they could become law.4 Proponents of this bill argue that it would make the federal regulatory system more transparent and democratic by shifting responsibility from unelected bureaucrats and requiring direct deliberation by the people’s representatives in Congress.5

But in key respects, the process used by agencies to create regulations is generally more democratic than how Congress tends to operate.6 Con-

6. To be sure, agencies might seem at first glance to be less democratic simply because they are headed by unelected officials. But that narrow view fails to account for the fact that agencies are, in important ways, tied closely to the electorate through the President, not to mention through ongoing congressional oversight. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Admin-
gress’s own actions—in particular, its attempts to repeal and replace the ACA, as well as the way in which it repealed fifteen regulations under the Congressional Review Act in 2017—show that efforts to shift regulatory decisionmaking into the legislative process would in reality weaken democratic deliberation and result in less thoughtful regulatory decisions. If the nation wants its regulatory system to reflect robust public deliberation, then passing legislation that would further entangle regulatory decisionmaking in legislative politics is likely to prove counterproductive.

I. CONGRESS, AGENCIES, AND DEMOCRACY

In a nation dedicated to democratic principles, it may seem surprising that most federal law in the United States today consists of rules or regulations issued by administrative agencies, rather than statutes written by Congress. Each year, agencies such as the Department of Transportation and the Securities and Exchange Commission collectively issue thousands of regulations, compared to roughly a hundred or fewer substantive statutes passed by Congress.

Although the administrators who head federal bureaucracies never stand for election, they are, of course, still accountable to elected officials in multiple ways. Appointed by the President, most administrators continue to serve only at the President’s pleasure and under the oversight of the White House. Moreover, the Senate must confirm the heads of agencies before they can take office. Congress must also expressly delegate to agencies the legal authority to create rules. When agencies issue rules, they must follow well-specified procedures that, among other things, require that the public receive notice and have an opportunity to comment on proposed rules before they can be made final. Agencies must stay within the bounds of these statutory guidelines or else the courts will strike down their regulations.

*itation*, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2332 (2001) (“[P]residential leadership establishes an electoral link between the public and the bureaucracy, increasing the latter’s responsiveness to the former.”). Moreover, electoral accountability is only one facet of democratic governance; another is the quality of democratic deliberation in policy decisionmaking. See, e.g., Jon Elster, The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory, in Foundations of Social Choice Theory 103–32 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1989) (discussing deliberation as one core conception of democracy).


Congress gives agencies the authority to issue legally binding rules because, among other reasons, legislators have neither the time nor the expertise to make all the highly technical policy judgments needed to enact sensible, effective regulations. Congress can call for greater safety in consumer products or reductions in water pollution, but figuring out exactly how to achieve these goals demands an in-depth understanding of regulated industries and an ability to establish more fine-grained policies. Administrative agencies—staffed as they are with career professionals, many with backgrounds in science and economics—constitute what Cass Sunstein has called the “most knowledgeable branch” of government. The officials in these agencies can take the time and devote the resources needed to gather public input and craft rules designed to implement the goals contained in statutes.

Although it makes sense for Congress to give regulatory authority to agencies, when Congress does so, it effectively gives up some degree of control over public policy decisions and their implementation. Congress still maintains control over agency budgets and continues to oversee what agencies do, and it always retains the ability to enact new laws that revise agencies’ authority, but the officials who run administrative agencies nevertheless possess considerable lawful discretion in deciding how to design regulatory standards. That agency discretion, in turn, enables the federal government to be more responsive to public concerns.

In an effort to retain more meaningful control over regulations, Congress used to insert legislative veto clauses into regulatory statutes, providing that agency regulations could be rejected by a majority vote of sometimes just a single chamber of Congress. But in 1983, the Supreme Court declared such legislative veto provisions unconstitutional in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha. The Court said that if Congress wishes to override agency decisions, then both chambers of Congress must pass legislation voiding or changing an agency decision or regulation—and that legislation either must win the president’s signature or be passed with sufficient majorities to override a presidential veto. In short, if Congress does not like a regulation that an agency creates, then it must follow the process outlined

14. Id. at 956–57.
in the Constitution for adopting legislation. As a practical matter, this means that Congress needs veto-proof majorities to pass legislation overriding an agency regulation, since presidents can be expected to veto legislation rejecting the regulations created by agencies within their own administrations. After all, the heads of agencies are the President’s appointees and, for most agencies, significant rules only go forward if they receive the blessing of the White House.  

Congress responded to the Court’s ruling in Chadha over a decade later by enacting the Congressional Review Act (CRA). The CRA does not obviate the constitutional requirements for passing legislation, but it establishes a fast-track process that enables Congress to repeal recent agency regulations by following special internal procedures, which most notably limit filibusters in the Senate. After an agency notifies Congress of a new regulation it has adopted, if Congress wishes to avail itself of the CRA’s procedures, then it has sixty session days to pass a resolution disapproving the regulation. If the resolution passes both houses and is signed by the president, then the disapproved regulation is formally repealed. Furthermore, if a regulation is repealed under the CRA, then the agency is barred from adopting any other regulation in the future that is “substantially the same,” unless Congress adopts new legislation that specifically gives the agency permission to do so.

Of course, presidents can always veto disapproval resolutions, which, as noted, they presumably would do for any regulations emanating from their own administrations. For this reason, the CRA as a practical matter has generally come into play only shortly following presidential transitions, since it offers the new president a short window to overturn regulations that were issued toward the end of the previous administration.

18. Id. § 802(a), (d).  
19. Id. § 802.  
20. Id. § 801(b)(1).  
22. MAEV E. M. CAREY, ALISS A M. DOLAN, & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43992, THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT: FREQUENTLY ASKED
In recent years, Republican members of Congress have been trying to pass additional bills that would give Congress more practical influence over agency regulations. For example, the House of Representatives has passed a bill that would expand the scope of the CRA by allowing Congress to repeal multiple regulations at once by voting on a single resolution of disapproval, rather than just proceeding one regulation at a time as provided in the CRA.23

The REINS Act would go still further. Instead of Congress just having the power to disapprove of regulations after agencies have already issued them, the REINS Act would require that Congress take affirmative action to approve new regulations before they could take effect.24 The bill’s requirement for legislative approval would apply only to “major rules,” which generally are those with economic effects above $100 million annually.25 For such regulations, the REINS Act would turn an otherwise final agency rule into merely a legislative proposal, subject to an up-or-down vote. The House passed the REINS Act in January 2017,26 and President Donald Trump has reportedly said that he will sign it if it reaches his desk.27

II. STARK LESSONS FROM “REPEAL AND REPLACE”

The REINS Act is ostensibly designed to make regulations more democratic by increasing Congress’s role in the regulatory process. Yet the way that Congress has handled its legislative affairs undermines the case for legislation requiring greater congressional involvement in the regulatory process. In particular, the means by which Republicans sought to repeal and replace the ACA in 2017 illustrate all too well how increased legislative involvement would serve to weaken democratic deliberation over government regulation.

Members of Congress from both parties, as well as longtime observers of congressional politics, have expressed shock at how congressional leaders conducted the process to try to repeal and replace the ACA.28 House Re-
publicans narrowly passed a repeal-and-replace bill in May 2017 that had only been released the night before the vote.29 House leaders thus not only short-circuited any opportunity for public deliberation, but they did not even wait for members to read and digest the legislation or to benefit from the scoring of the legislation typically provided by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).30 As Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) commented at the time, “any bill that has been posted less than 24 hours—going to be debated three or four hours, not scored—needs to be viewed with suspicion.”31

When attention turned to the Senate during the summer months, the process was no more transparent or deliberative. Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) crafted the Senate’s version of the legislation in complete secrecy, prompting Senator Ron Johnson (R-WI) to complain that Senate leaders were trying to “jam this thing through” before the Fourth of July recess.32 Johnson emphasized the need for more information about the bill, lamenting that informed debate “seems to be foreign to this place.”33 Despite such complaints, when McConnell tried to move the legislation forward after the July holiday recess, the process proved no more informed than before. Republicans approved a motion to proceed with debate on a bill before they had even settled upon a bill.34 In a widely-lauded speech on

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34. Sean Sullivan, Kelsey Snell, Ed O’Keeffe & John Wagner, McCain’s Return to Senate Injects Momentum into GOP Health-Care Battle, WASH. POST (July 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/trumps-tough-talk-on-health-care-aims-to-revive-flagging-senate-effort/2017/07/24/4faa68f3-7091-11e7-9ea-d56bd556d8b8_story.html (noting widespread “confusion Monday about exactly which direction senators would go on Tuesday when and if the voting starts” and reporting Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) as asking about the motion to proceed, “What are we proceeding to?”).
the Senate floor, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) decried McConnell’s strategy of “coming up with a proposal behind closed doors” and “then springing it on skeptical members”—although he, too, supported the initial motion to proceed.\(^35\)

McConnell’s gambit ultimately failed—with Senators Susan Collins (R-ME), Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), and, most dramatically, McCain casting the decisive votes to kill the legislation. Down to the very end, the tactics were the same. The underlying “skinny repeal” bill—which the CBO estimated would have left sixteen million people uninsured and raised premiums in the exchanges by twenty percent—was released only a few hours before the decisive vote.\(^36\) Senator Graham called the bill a “disaster” and a “fraud.”\(^37\) He and two other Republican Senators said they would vote for it only if they received assurances that it would never become law.\(^38\)

When Senator Graham and Senator Bill Cassidy (R-LA) revived the health care repeal effort in September, Senate Republicans once again tried to rush the bill to a vote as quickly as possible. This time, they released the final version of the Graham-Cassidy bill only a few days before the Senate was scheduled to vote on it. They held just a single legislative hearing—one at which the majority called other senators to be the principal witnesses and at which only five members of the public were reportedly allowed to attend after protests occurred in the hearing room.\(^39\) Senate leaders also did not intend to wait for a complete CBO score, and they planned to allow only ninety seconds of floor debate.\(^40\) Yet this effort too failed, as three R-


38. These Senators demanded assurances from the House Speaker that he would not approve the exact same bill, so that they would have an opportunity to make further amendments in a conference committee. Robert Pear & Thomas Kaplan, **Senate Rejects Slimmed-Down Obamacare Repeal as McCain Votes No**, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/us/politics/obamacare-partial-repeal-senate-republicans-revolt.html.


40. Bob Bryan, **The Latest Republican Obamacare Repeal is Being Pushed through the Senate at**
publicans vowed to vote against the bill, denying Republicans the majority they needed to act under a special budget reconciliation process that is exempt from the Senate filibuster.\footnote{Thomas Kaplan & Robert Pear, Senate Republicans Say They Will Not Vote on Health Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/us/politics/mcconnell-obamacare-repeal-graham-cassidy-trump.html.}


Even though the process used to attempt to repeal the ACA might seem like an extreme example, the reality is that for years now, in the face of growing political polarization, most controversial legislation under both Democratic and Republican leadership of Congress has often moved forward in what political scientist Barbara Sinclair has aptly, if perhaps charitably, described as an “unorthodox” manner—driven by party leaders and often bypassing or dismissing the work of committees.\footnote{BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWSMAKING NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (4th ed. 2011).}

The REINS Act, if enacted, would only risk infusing such unorthodoxy into major regulatory decisions.\footnote{Some leading scholars have argued that the rulemaking process has seen its own recent introduction of unorthodox practices. Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789 (2015). Even if this is the case, the REINS Act would still amount to a radical change in the rule-making process.}

### III. Further Lessons from the Congressional Review Act

Other legislative actions during the opening of the 115th Congress have presented a similarly revealing, if also disconcerting, picture of what greater congressional involvement in the regulatory process would look like. During the first ten months of 2017, Congress used the CRA to repeal fifteen

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regulations that were designed to deliver public protections on issues such as Internet privacy, gun safety, water quality, and fair business practices.\textsuperscript{45} Senate Majority Leader McConnell hailed the repeals of these rules as the most significant legislative achievements of the 115th Congress’s first six months,\textsuperscript{46} but a look at how Congress went about repealing these rules only reinforces the conclusion that the first branch of government suffers from a deliberative deficit.

Consider who participated in the development—and subsequent repeal—of the now-defunct rules. Based on the agency dockets for each of the fifteen regulations, staff at the agencies that issued the rules reviewed a total of over 420,000 public comments.\textsuperscript{47} These comments came from a diverse collection of individual members of the public as well as from businesses, public interest groups, and state and local officials. By contrast, the process Congress used in repealing these rules appears to have been driven largely by just one segment of society: industry. The New York Times reported that industry lobbyists began working with Republican staff members on Capitol Hill “within days of the election” to decide which regulations to target for repeal.\textsuperscript{48}

Not only do agencies entertain a full array of public comments, they also must take the time to respond to these comments in writing as they prepare their analyses of their proposed rules.\textsuperscript{49} Most significant rules must be separately reviewed by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the White House.\textsuperscript{50} Such painstaking analysis and deliberation can take time—nearly two and a half years on average for the fifteen recently repealed rules. The final versions of these same regulations together contained over 1,700 pages of justification and analysis, all made available to the public.

Unlike agencies, Congress is not required to respond to public comments

\textsuperscript{45} Rules at Risk (Dec. 25, 2017), http://rulesatrisk.org/.
\textsuperscript{47} All calculations and data referred to in this section are available upon request.
\textsuperscript{49} See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553 & 706 (2012) (requiring agencies to publish a statement of a rule’s “basis and purpose” and to avoid acting in an “arbitrary” manner); see generally Lisa Schultz Bressman & Glen Staszewski, Judicial Review of Agency Discretion, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 226 (Michael E. Herz, Richard Murphy, & Kathryn Watts, eds., 2017) (“Courts have long held that an agency must respond to ‘relevant’ and ‘significant’ comments.”).
\textsuperscript{50} Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
or to explain its decisions. Congress managed to repeal all fifteen rules combined in fewer than 2,000 words—what amounts to roughly six double-spaced pages of text in total.\footnote{We reviewed all of the CRA resolutions to calculate their length.} Furthermore, by repealing these regulations under the CRA, Congress by extension banned agencies from adopting any substantially similar regulations in the future—all without explaining to the public how repealing these rules will affect their welfare.\footnote{See supra note 21 and accompanying text.}

In contrast to the years that agencies spent evaluating comments and analyzing their regulations, it took Congress a mere four months on average—including congressional recesses—for both chambers to vote to repeal the fifteen regulations, mostly on party-line votes.\footnote{For each resolution of disapproval, we calculated the amount of time elapsed from when the underlying agency rule was submitted to Congress to when the resolution of disapproval was passed by both chambers.} Even if Congress wanted to take a more deliberate approach, the CRA’s fast-track procedures explicitly limit the time for floor debate on resolutions of disapproval.\footnote{See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.}

Congress can no longer use this law’s special procedures to repeal regulations adopted by the Obama Administration due to the CRA’s limitation on disapprovals after sixty session days following notice of a rulemaking.\footnote{See supra note 19 and accompanying text.} But this has not kept members of Congress from using the CRA to target additional regulatory actions adopted since January by independent agencies which are exempt from OIRA review and thus more insulated from White House influence. In October 2017, Congress passed a resolution of disapproval overturning a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau regulation adopted in July 2017 that would have blocked credit card companies and banks from inserting mandatory arbitration clauses into their contracts that keep consumers from taking legal action over complaints of institutional abuses.\footnote{David Sherfinski, \textit{House Votes to undo Federal Consumer Bureau’s Arbitration Rule}, \textit{WASH. TIMES} (July 25, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jul/25/house-votes-to-undo-consumer-financial-protection/.} President Trump signed this resolution into law at a private signing ceremony reportedly attended by the heads of various bank lobbying groups.\footnote{Sylvan Lane, \textit{Trump Repeals Consumer Arbitration Rule, Wins Banker Praise}, \textit{THE HILL} (Nov. 1, 2017), http://www.thehill.com/policy/finance/358297-trump-repeals-consumer-bureau-arbitration-rule-joined-by-heads-of-banking.}

Until this year, the only previous occasion when Congress used the CRA to strike down a regulation occurred in 2001, when Congress repealed a major Occupational Safety and Health Administration workplace safety rule adopted at the end of the Clinton Administration. At the time, Peg
Seminario, the Director for Health and Safety for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, complained to the *New York Times* about what she called the “stunning” process Congress followed: “This rule is ten years in the making, with ten weeks of public hearings on it, and now they want to wipe it out with not even one hearing and less than ten hours of debate. That’s about as undemocratic a process as you can get.”

**CONCLUSION**

The REINS Act would go much farther than the CRA because it would require legislative approval of all major rules before they could take legal effect. It would also curtail democratic deliberation by Congress even more sharply than the CRA. Under the REINS Act, debate over a regulation in the House would be limited to one hour total, while the “world’s greatest deliberative body”—the Senate—would be afforded a whopping two hours. With major public health and welfare consequences potentially hanging in the balance, such tight constraints on legislative debate are at odds with the REINS Act’s ostensible goal of advancing sound, democratic decisionmaking.

Of course, time limits on debate can be viewed as understandable from another perspective: Congress already has a lot on its plate. Agencies typically produce close to 100 regulations each year that would be deemed “major” under the REINS Act and which would demand formal approval by Congress.

Moreover, members of Congress are generalists. That is one of the main reasons for Congress delegating regulatory responsibility to agency officials in the first place, as agencies have the time, resources, and expertise needed to analyze policy issues with care. It is precisely because Congress does not have the time and resources to attend to the finer details of regulation that it has passed laws which delegate rulemaking responsibility to

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62. *Id.*
agencies, such as the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, and the Clean Water Act.

In fulfilling their statutory duties, agencies typically invest years of study and public engagement when developing major regulations and preparing the necessary underlying analyses of how the public will be affected by the new rules. Under the REINS Act, the outcome of those extensive agency deliberations would ultimately hinge on a legislative process culminating in a mere three hours of floor debate.

If the REINS Act were law, failure of both chambers to approve a regulation within seventy session days would mean that the regulation could not take effect, and no new approval resolution could be considered until after the next congressional election. In emergencies, the president would be authorized to override the Act temporarily and allow the regulation to take effect—but only for ninety calendar days, after which the regulation would cease to have any legal impact again.

If the Senate were to pass the REINS Act and President Trump were to sign it, then agencies’ regulatory decisionmaking in the future could well become infected with some of the same dysfunctionalities that both Democrats and Republicans find afflict today’s congressional process. Right now, administrative law calls upon agencies to make decisions based on public input and analysis of how best to fulfill their statutory responsibilities and advance overall public value. By adding a legal requirement for congressional approval before regulations can take effect, the REINS Act would effectively encourage agencies to base their decisions over highly complex and consequential regulations not on deliberations focused on the expected impacts on all segments of society, but instead on consideration of political stratagems in Congress, be it controlled by Republicans or Democrats.

One thing is clear: Republican legislators have, through their actions in Congress over the first part of 2017, ironically made a case against one of the very regulatory reforms they favor. Through their handling of the most

66. CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 105–07 (4th ed. 2011) (summarizing research on EPA rules that showed “the average time that elapsed in rulemaking . . . ranged from slightly more than two years to just under five years.”).
68. Levin, supra note 61, at 1452.
69. Id. at 1453.
salient legislative debate in the opening months of the new Congress—health care—and arguably their most significant early domestic policy accomplishment—the CRA repeals—they have unwittingly undercut the case for the REINS Act. Rather than inspire confidence that increased congressional involvement in regulation would enhance democratic values, the Republicans’ repeal efforts have only underscored the rationale underlying earlier Congresses’ decisions to vest administrative agencies with the primary responsibility for making important regulatory determinations.